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1. This study develops a framework for thinking about how basic legal service interventions addressing 
problems of a civil and administrative nature can be taken to scale in a sustainable manner to enable 
improved access to justice for people living in the most vulnerable Low Income Countries (LICs) 
and/or Fragile and Conflict-affected States (FCAS). 
2. The framework is built around three key questions: 
 What do we know about the unit costs of basic legal services and how can we calculate them;  
 How can scaled up legal services be financed sustainably; and 
 What are the political conditions that enable justice models to be taken to scale? 
3. The study analyses these questions in the context of 17 basic legal service interventions, 12 in LIC 
and MIC countries and 5 in HIC country contexts, drawing also upon lessons from the supply of basic 
health and education services, but recognising that the justice sector is unique due to a multitude 
of factors. These factors include high politicisation (lying at the heart of the relationship between 
the state and the people); institutional complexity (fragmented across a range of institutions); 
plurality (state and non-state systems); opaqueness (demand not always visible); functional 
complexity (types of legal service provision) and heterogeneity of (user) need. 
The Cost of Basic Legal Services 
4. The study draws on a range of country legal needs surveys to develop a new methodology for 
calculating the unit costs of basic legal services and applies it to 12 of our country case studies. This 
produces estimates of the costs for scaling up basic legal services to provide national coverage 
ranging from USD 0.1 to USD 1.3 per capita in non-OECD countries and USD 3 to USD 6 in 3 OECD 
countries, likely reflecting the higher cost of wages. 
5. The study also develops a new methodology for assessing the affordability of basic legal services. 
This analysis demonstrates that while some countries could afford to scale up current programmes, 
for most of the poorest countries in our study the cost of basic legal services looks clearly 
unaffordable relative to both government revenues and spending on the judiciary. 
6. The study also analyses spending on judiciary and finds that developing countries are already 
strongly prioritising funding the judiciary from their own budgets. In sharp contrast, our analysis of 
donor funding shows that while funding to the justice sector has increased, the current level is still 
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very low compared to funding for other sectors. This suggests there is a potential opportunity to 
press donors to increase their funding to bring it more in line with developing countries’ own 
commitments and the spending patterns in donors’ own countries. 
7. The study considers the potential of technology to reduce the cost of basic legal service provision 
in developing countries but finds that it is no silver bullet. Technology is likely to be supplementary 
to rather than displacing of traditional forms of delivery, with mobile phone-based innovations 
offering better access to individuals than internet-based ones at the present time. 
Financing Basic Legal Services 
8. The study considers a range of sustainable financing options from government, donors, 
philanthropy, the private sector, users and hybrid models. The analysis of these options concludes 
that key factors determining the appropriateness of a particular option are whether the relevant 
basic legal service intervention produces a monetisable outcome and/or an outcome which can be 
measured. Unbundling basic legal services may therefore be key to realising these characteristics 
and expanding the available financing options for a given intervention. 
The Political Economy of Basic Legal Services 
9. The study finds that key political economy considerations in scaling include: 
 Whether there is political support for scale-up, both at the state level and the level of front-line 
delivery agencies, recognising that political will may not always reflect the motivations that we 
might like to see; 
 Whether there is normative fit/sufficient demand for the services, whether that be a tradition 
of mediation or a pro bono culture amongst lawyers; 
 Whether there is resistance from elite/vested interests, whether traditional leaders, lawyers or 
local and central government; 
 Whether there is capacity for scale-up both within government and within the organisations 
that plan to scale up; and 
 Whether there is sufficient financing for scale-up, depending on whether it is for short-to 
medium term advocacy or for the provision of services over the long-term. 
10. There are a number of policy and programming responses to situational analysis which reveals that 
some or all of these factors are missing. These range from building demand/support for basic legal 
service provision to delivering basic legal services either through service delivery in other sectors 
such as health or outside of state structures altogether. 
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Further Work 
11. This study has only begun to make inroads into this important topic and there are a number of areas 
we identify on which further work would be valuable and could ultimately assist in placing the 
justice sector on the same footing as education and health in global financing discussions, debates 
on implementation of the Global Goals that have been agreed upon as part of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development to build upon the Millennium Development Goals and value for money 
analysis undertaken by organisations such as the Copenhagen Consensus Center. 
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Chapter 1:      Introduction 
 The Law & Development Partnership (LDP) has been engaged by the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) and Open Society Foundations (OSF) to research how basic legal service 
interventions can be taken to scale in a sustainable manner to enable improved access to justice 
for people living in the most vulnerable Low Income Countries (LICs) and/or Fragile and Conflict-
affected States (FCAS).1 This report suggests an outline framework for thinking about this question, 
drawing on concrete examples in a range of country contexts. 
 The research will be valuable for country programmes seeking guidance on taking basic legal service 
pilots to scale; donors, governments and private sector organisations wishing to assist with the scale 
up process and international organisations involved in the discussions around the implementation 
on Global Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to build upon the Millennium 
Development Goals on realising access to justice for people in countries around the world. 
 The study considers 12 basic legal service interventions in mostly LIC to Middle Income Countries 
(MICs)2 that it distils into 5 broad models of intervention: community-based paralegals, 
microfinancing justice, community law centres, hybrid models and justice hubs. The study also 
draws upon lessons from basic legal service provision in five High Income Countries (HICs), without 
necessarily assuming that these are models to strive towards (indeed, recognising that scaled up 
legal provision may look different in LICs and MICs, whether because of the need to navigate 
different normative environments, for example by integrating customary justice systems or working 
around a limited pro bono culture). 
 The study also considers lessons from the supply of basic health and education services, while 
being cognisant of the similarities and differences between justice and these sectors. The 
differences that set justice apart include high politicisation (lying at the heart of the relationship 
between the state and the people); institutional complexity (fragmented across a range of 
institutions); plurality (state and non-state systems); opaqueness (demand not always visible); 
functional complexity (types of legal service provision) and heterogeneity of (user) need. 
 The  study proceeds to answer three key questions: 
 What do we know about the unit costs of basic legal services and how can we calculate them; 
 How can scaled up legal services be financed sustainably; and 
                                                          
1 Throughout, we define FCAS based on the World Bank’s Harmonised List of Fragile Situations for the Financial Year 2016, 
which includes our case study countries of Liberia, Myanmar and Sierra Leone. 
2 Several of the countries in the case studies had their income category reclassified by the World Bank in July 2015.  This study 
uses these new categories, namely Low Income Countries (LIC) = Liberia, Sierra Leone & Rwanda; Lower Middle Income Countries 
(LMIC)= Bangladesh, Kenya, Myanmar and Ukraine; Upper Middle Income Countries (UMIC) = South Africa; High Income Countries 
(HIC) non-OECD = Argentina (previously upper middle income country); High income OECD= Australia, Canada and UK.  Where 
the study refers to MIC it means LMIC and UMIC. 
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 What are the political conditions that enable justice models to be taken to scale? 
These questions were distilled from a broader range of questions set out in the original Terms of 
Reference dated June 2015 and agreed in the revised Terms of Reference dated 20 August 2015, 
attached at Annex A of Volume 2. 
 This report was prepared following the submission of an initial Concept Note on 11 September 
2015, a final Concept Note on 29 September 2015 and an Inception Report on 2 October 2015. 
Tentative conclusions were then submitted on 30 October 2015 and discussed and tested at the 
Open Society Foundation’s Charette on a Proposed Shared Framework for Legal Empowerment 
held in Istanbul between 4 and 6 November 2015. 
Context  
 Only a relatively small proportion of programmes aimed at service delivery to the poor are able 
successfully to reach scale and sustainability – indeed scalable service provision solutions in 
developing countries (in all sectors) are considered the exception rather than the rule.3 
 Where they exist, successful examples of scaled and sustainable programmes have tended to focus 
on narrowly targeted solutions to specific challenges – for example oral rehydration therapy,4 
vaccines, and water sanitation to reduce childhood mortality,5 micronutrient supplements and 
breastfeeding advocacy to reduce malnutrition, and conditional cash transfers to encourage school 
attendance.6  Notably, all these examples are all drawn from the health and education sectors. 
 In contrast, Tom Carothers’ 2003 assessment7 of donor engagement in the justice sector/rule of 
law, that “examples of significant, positive sustained impacts are few” remains true today. This is in 
part due to the fact that over the past fifteen years or so, there has overall been limited strategic 
and financial donor engagement with and less investment in the justice sector than in other sectors. 
For example, from 2000 onwards there was no justice Millennium Development Goal to drive donor 
and developing country partner engagement with the sector. Over the period 2005-2013, only 1.8% 
of aid has gone to the justice sector compared to 7.5% for education and 11.7% for health.8 The 
                                                          
3 Chandy, L., Hosono, A., Kharas, H.L., & Linn, J. F. (Eds.) (2013). ‘Getting to Scale: How to Bring Development Solutions to Millions 
of Poor People’, Brookings Institution Press, pp. 2-3. 
4 UNICEF, at http://www.unicef.org/health/index_43834.html accessed 15 July 2015 
5 BRAC, at http://www.brac.net/beyond-boundaries/content/mdg-4-reduce-child-mortality accessed 15 July 2015. 
6 For example, Opportunidades in Mexico reaching around one quarter of the population, Bolsa Familia in Brazil reaching 12 
million families, and the Kecamatan Development Programme in Indonesia providing grants for small infrastructure projects to 
half of all rural villages.   
7 Carothers, T. (2003). ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: the Problem of Knowledge’. Working Paper 34. Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
8 LDP analysis using OECD DAC CRS database. http://stats.oecd.org/. Calculation based on constant USD. Health includes 
population and reproductive health. Legal and judicial development includes support to institutions, systems and procedures of 
the justice sector, both formal and informal; support to ministries of justice, the interior and home affairs; judges and courts; 
legal drafting services; bar and lawyers associations; professional legal education; maintenance of law and order and public safety; 
border management; law enforcement agencies, police, prisons and their supervision; ombudsmen; alternative dispute 
resolution, arbitration and mediation; legal aid and counsel; traditional, indigenous and paralegal practices that fall outside the 
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figures are even lower if you exclude Afghanistan and Iraq which alone account for 30% of the total: 
see Appendix 1. Indeed the ratio is just 0.2% if you just look at Sub Saharan Africa. Yet donor 
governments typically spend around 4-5% of their own budgets on the public law and order sector 
in their own countries compared to 12% on education and 15% on health.9 
 This disparity in levels of investment has existed notwithstanding the fact that the World Bank’s 
Voices of the Poor Survey of 2000 highlighted that justice was in fact more important for poor 
people than health or education. DFID’s 2009 White Paper10 identified justice as a basic service, on 
a par with health or education. The 2011 New Deal for donor engagement in fragile states justice 
identified justice as one of the five peace and state building goals. The new Global Goal 16 to 
“promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for 
all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” offers an opportunity to 
raise investment in the justice sector.11 
 Although further evidence is required to demonstrate causal linkages between the MDGs and 
outcomes in health and education they are generally believed to have shift domestic priorities,12 
leverage international transfers,13 and increase domestic spending,14 assisting in shifting focus in 
the case of health away from attention on single topics to a more systemic approach.15 By way of 
comparison, there are a number of ways Global Goal 16 might impact the justice sector: 
 Focusing donor attention and spending on the justice sector, some of which is already taking 
place as donor and development organisations plan research and events around how to 
implement and monitor progress against Global Goal 16. 
                                                          
formal legal system. Category also includes measures that support the improvement of legal frameworks, constitutions, laws and 
regulations; legislative and constitutional drafting and review; legal reform; integration of formal and informal systems of law as 
well as public legal education; dissemination of information on entitlements and remedies for injustice; awareness campaigns. 
The category does not activities that are primarily aimed at supporting security system reform or undertaken in connection with 
post-conflict and peace building activities (such as support to police reform in context of UN peacekeeping mission). 
9 OECD budget at a glance, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/government-at-a-glance-2015/structure-of-general-
government-expenditures-by-function-cofog_gov_glance-2015-17-en  
cited in Manuel et al ODI 2015 Working paper 416 http://www.odi.org/publications/9462-financing-future-international-public-
finance-should-fund-global-social-compact-eradicate-poverty  
10 DFID (2009).  Eliminating World Poverty: Building Our Common Future. 
11 UN, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html  
12 Lucci, P., Khan, A. and Hoy, C. (2015). Piecing together the MDG puzzle: domestic policy, government spending and 
performance.  ODI Working Paper 426. 
13 Lucci, P., Khan, A. and Hoy, C. (2015). Piecing together the MDG puzzle: domestic policy, government spending and 
performance.  ODI Working Paper 426.  Examples include a multitude of new institutions and partnerships including the Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), the Global Fund against AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM) and the Global Partnership 
for Education (GPE), and of a series of global commissions such as the Macroeconomic Commission on Health (2001) and UN 
Secretary General’s Global Strategy on Women and Children’s Health (2008) in addition to traditional ODA spending. 
14 Lucci, P., Khan, A. and Hoy, C. (2015). Piecing together the MDG puzzle: domestic policy, government spending and 
performance.  ODI Working Paper 426; Burnett, N. and Felsman, C. (2012). ‘Post-2015 Education MDGs’. Results for Development 
Institute; ODI. 
15 Schewitzer, J et al. (2012). ‘Post-2015 Health MDGs’. Results for Development Institute; ODI. 
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 Focusing national government attention on access to justice, but given the history of the MDGs, 
this may not generate sufficient political will to improve justice service delivery or increase 
domestic spending. 
 Providing an advocacy lever for communities to generate political action at the country level.  
Examples of this are the Alternative Law Group in the Philippines using Global Goal 16 to obtain 
a sectoral presence for justice in the Philippine Development Plan, Kenyan legal aid providers 
Kituo Cha Sheria working with the International Commission of Jurists Kenya and the Law Society 
of Kenya to integrate Global Goal 16 into the draft National Human Rights Policy and Action Plan 
to provide a framework for other legislation such as the Legal Aid Bill which has since moved to 
the next stage of law-making and Jordan using Global Goal 16 to begin a national dialogue on 
justice issues.16  
 The research opportunities presented by this study are particularly valuable given the possibility of 
contributing to the work around the implementation of Global Goal 16.  For example, the 
Copenhagen Consensus Centre, which uses cost-benefit analysis to assess the targets under each 
of the Global Goals notes that the cost-benefit of the value of achieving the majority of the targets 
under Global Goal 16 (as oppose to measuring the achievement of the targets, on which 
considerable work has been done) is uncertain due to a lack of information on quantifiable costs 
and benefits.17  Data collected as part of follow-on work to this study could contribute to changing 
this picture and the perception that access to justice is too difficult to measure. 
Definitional Issues 
 The research brief raises a number of definitional issues that have been central to identifying the 
scope of the project. These include definitions of each of the following concepts: legal services, 
basic legal services, scale and financially sustainable. In this section, we clarify the nature of the 
definitions we have used and the rationale behind our choices where applicable: 
 Legal services: legal services are defined by reference to the types of legal problems they can 
assist resolve. Here, the focus is on legal services provided to solve legal problems of a civil and 
administrative nature rather than a criminal nature. It is often in these areas where primary 
justice needs are found.  So, across our case study countries, the most common legal problems 
of this kind which have been identified have included public services including healthcare 
                                                          
16 Namati. (2015). ‘Emerging Trends in National Implementation of SDG Goal 16 and Justice Targets: Three Case Studies from 
Kenya, the Philippines and Jordan’. 
17 Lomborg, B. (2014). ‘Preliminary benefit-cost assessment of the final OWG outcome’. Copenhagen Consensus Centre.  Note 
that Goal 16.9: By 2030 provide legal identification for all including birth registration and Goal 16.10: Ensure public access to 
information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements have been 
categorised as good. 
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(Argentina),18 family relationships after personal security (Bangladesh),19 money disputes about 
debts, contracts and loans after theft (Sierra Leone)20 and violations of consumer rights and 
employment issues (Ukraine)21. This is not out of keeping with the OECD countries we have 
looked at where prominent problems include consumer issues (Australia)22 and problems with 
the products of goods and services and employment (Netherlands).23  Legal services provided to 
solve legal problems of this nature are therefore typically services provided in the areas of 
property rights, family law, labour law, access to services (including health and education) and 
legal identity.24 
 Basic legal services: “legal advice services, public legal education, legal awareness, mediation, 
ADR and/or paralegals backed up by litigation, policy advocacy and state actions which 
significantly increase the accessibility of dispute resolution so that people can access justice for 
their day to day legal problems”.25 These are key elements of a wider set of primary justice 
services as they provide a basic level of legal education, advice and assistance with non-court-
based dispute resolution together with referral to providers of formal litigation services and 
court-based representation where appropriate.26  Accordingly, the research has generally27 not 
treated national models of legal aid for formal litigation services and court-based representation 
as models of basic legal service provision as we consider these services more analogous to 
secondary healthcare28 and secondary education.29  So, for example, TIMAP for Justice’s 
paralegals are supervised by lawyers to whom cases can exceptionally be referred for litigation 
but this is atypical service provision.30 
                                                          
18 Asociacion Civil por la Igualidad y la Justicia (2013). ‘Disadvantaged communities, rights and access to justice: a study of unmet 
legal necessities’. ACIJ. 
19 Tilburg University. (2010). ‘Legal needs of vulnerable people: A study in Azerbaijan, Mali, Rwanda, Egypt and Bangladesh’.  
TISCO Working Paper Series on Civil Law and Conflict Resolution Systems, 009/2010.  
20 Open Society Justice Initiative. (2010). ‘Preliminary Findings on Participatory Baseline KAP Survey from the Scale-up of Justice 
Services programme, Sierra Leone. 
21 Kobzin, D. et al. (2011). ‘Level of legal capacity of the Ukrainian population: accessibility and effectiveness of legal services’. 
International Renaissance Foundation Kharkov Institute of Social Research. 
22 Legal Aid Commission of NSW (2013). ‘Annual report 2012-2013’. 
23 Van Velthoven, B. & ter Voert, M. (2004). ‘Paths to Justice in the Netherlands Looking for signs of social exclusion’. Leiden 
University. 
24 Original Terms of Reference (June 2015). 
25 Original Terms of Reference (June 2015). 
26 This reflects the OED definition of “basic” as (1) “forming an essential foundation or starting point”; (2) “offering or constituting 
the minimum required without elaboration or luxury”; and (3) “common to or required by everyone; primary and ineradicable or 
inalienable”.   
27 BRAC’s HRLS and China’s Legal Aid Centres are perhaps the exception to this; the hybrid models in South Africa and the Ukraine 
also provide legal representation but as part of the tier of secondary service provision. 
28 Merriam-Webster (2015) defines secondary healthcare as “medical care provided by a specialist or facility upon referral by a 
primary care physician that requires more specialized knowledge, skill, or equipment than the primary care physician has”; 
Mosby’s Medical Dictionary (2009) suggests“an intermediate level of health care that includes diagnosis and treatment, 
performed in a hospital having specialized equipment and laboratory facilities.” 
29 Merriam-Webster (2015) defines secondary education as “a school intermediate between elementary school and college and 
usually offering general, technical, vocational, or college-preparatory courses.” 
30 See Annex F: Community-based Paralegals Case Study; TIMAP for Justice and Others in Sierra Leone. 
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 Scale: “serving and effectively benefiting a significant proportion of people living across a 
country, region or population”.31 This recognises that there are different ways of defining scale, 
including increasing the geographic coverage of a basic legal service, increasing access to 
existing basic legal services for example by increasing the capacity or density of existing 
provision, or increasing the impact of basic legal service provision.32 It also recognises that there 
are trade-offs and tensions inherent in going to scale; for example, those with the most acute 
legal needs may be a significant proportion of people but a minority of the population as well as 
potentially concentrated in hard to reach areas or dispersed widely across the country as a 
whole. As a corollary, going to scale may involve increasing inputs, increasing services, expanding 
the client base for delivery, using inputs more efficiently or improving outcomes.  The 
appropriate approach to scale in a particular country will depend on what is needed and what 
has proven to be effective in meeting those needs in that country context. This requires an 
assessment of country-specific basic legal needs as they pertain to basic legal services and an 
approach which is politically smart and iterative rather than technocratic and linear. In 
Myanmar, for example, Namati seek to scale up community paralegals to cover a third of the 
country to generate a sufficient evidence base for robust advocacy around land issues.33  
Ultimate scale-up is arguably taking basic legal service provision to scale in a way that is capable 
of meeting all the basic legal needs in a given country. 
 Financially sustainable: “cost-effective models, which do not rely on donor funds and instead 
earn income from their services from other stakeholders (government, citizens, for-profit 
investors, etc.)”. Central to this concept are therefore two notions: (1) the notion of cost-
effectiveness i.e. that the aggregate net benefit or benefit (social and individual) minus cost 
(again, social and individual) of a particular intervention is positive and (2) the notion that the 
cost of an intervention should be financed using a diverse and ideally self-generating funding 
base. Of course, these two notions are linked in that key to the ability of a particular intervention 
to attract finance from a broad funding base will be its ability to demonstrate its cost-
effectiveness. We note, however, that both notions as they relate to questions of sustainability 
must be considered against a backdrop of what the ultimate objectives of basic legal service 
provision are, recognising that sometimes this may be a short to medium-term objective of 
focusing attention around a particular issue to catalyse policy change such as land reform in 
Myanmar34 and sometimes it may be a longer-term objective of providing a level of basic legal 
service provision on a permanent basis. The time horizon on which sustainability falls to be 
assessed may have important implications for financing options. 
Approach and methodology 
 A three-pronged approach to the research has been adopted as follows: 
                                                          
31 Original Terms of Reference (June 2015). 
32 Original Terms of Reference (June 2015).  
33 See Annex F: Community-based Paralegals Case Study; Namati Sector-Specific Paralegals in Myanmar. 
34 Ibid.  
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 Research on the supply of legal advice and assistance as a basic service in a limited number of 
agreed LICs and MICs, namely: 
o Community-based Paralegals (Liberia, Myanmar, Sierra Leone); 
o Microfinancing Justice (Bangladesh, Microjustice4All and Microjusticia Argentina35); 
o Community law centres (China and Rwanda); 
o Hybrid models (South Africa and Ukraine); and 
o Justice hubs (Kenya and Uganda). 
 Research on successful scale ups of the supply of basic health and education in LICs and MICs.  
 Research into the use of technology as a cost saving measure in the supply of basic legal services 
in OECD HICs, namely Australia (New South Wales), Canada (Ontario), the Netherlands and the 
UK (principally England and Wales), recognising that these jurisdictions have not necessarily 
‘solved the problem of basic legal service provision’.   
Each of these prongs of research has yielded lessons for each of the three research questions. 
 Evidence used to answer the research questions has included material drawn from the following 
sources:  
 Programme data on unit costs; 
 Macro-level data from the World Development Indicators and national budget publications;  
 Interviews with stakeholders including donors to and implementers of programmes delivering 
basic legal services (a list of stakeholders is available at Annex B of Volume 2 and a semi-
structured questionnaire is available at Annex C of Volume 2); and  
 A literature review (a list of documents considered is available at Annex D of Volume 2).  
 This evidence has been analysed and fed into an outline framework for thinking about how you take 
basic legal services to scale in a financially sustainable way which includes a typology of basic legal 
service models, a range of unit costs for the provision of service through those models, a typology 
of financing options and their likely suitability for different contexts and a checklist of political 
economy considerations for implementing a scale-up. 
                                                          
35 Note, however, that Argentina is an HIC, as is Peru where Microjustice4All operates: see Annex F of Volume 2. 
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Chapter 2:      Models of Service Provision 
Key Characteristics of Basic Legal Services 
 Basic legal service interventions in LICs and MICs can display a range of key differentiating 
characteristics, for example: 
 Types of legal problems addressed: interventions may address the full range of problems 
of a civil and administrative nature such as BRAC’s Human Rights and Legal Aid Services 
(HRLS) programme36 or only a single type of problem, such as community-based paralegals 
in Myanmar who assist only with problems relating to land.37 
 Geography of service provision: interventions may provide basic legal services on a 
peripatetic basis, like community-based paralegals in Sierra Leone who are based in offices 
in local communities and travel further afield by motorbike,38 or remotely, like the lawyers 
providing advice through M-Sheria’s text messaging service in Kenya.39 
 Identity of service providers: interventions may see basic legal services provided mostly by 
non-lawyers, like Community Justice Advisers in Liberia,40 or mostly by lawyers, such as 
Community Law Centres in China.41 
 Nature of funding sources: interventions may be funded (all or in part) by donors, such as 
community-based paralegals in Myanmar,42 by the private sector, such as Microjusticia 
Argentina,43 or by national or regional government, such as Maison d’Accès à la Justice in 
Rwanda.44 
 Characteristics of broader context: interventions may be isolated occurrences, such as the 
work of Microjustice4All, or part of a wider network of service provision, whether in the 
private sector like BRAC’s HRLS programme45 or government, like South Africa’s Community 
Advice Offices46 and Ukraine’s Community Legal Centres.47 
 
These characteristics can also vary over time, as interventions develop from isolated non-state-
funded programmes to state-funded mechanisms of service delivery to aspects of a much broader 
system of state-funded service delivery. So, for example, Sierra Leone’s paralegals began as part 
of the donor-funded TIMAP for Justice Programme but are now positioned to transition into part 
                                                          
36 See Annex F: Microfinancing Justice Case Study; Legal Aid Clinics in Bangladesh. 
37 See Annex F: Community-based Paralegals Case Study; Namati Sector-Specific Paralegals in Myanmar. 
38 See Annex F: Community-based Paralegals Case Study; TIMAP for Justice and Others in Sierra Leone. 
39 See Annex F: Justice Hubs and Hybrids Case Study; Legal Aid Centres, Community Justice Centres and Mobile Law in Kenya. 
40 See Annex F: Community-based Paralegals Case Study; Community Justice Advisers in Liberia. 
41 See Annex F: National Community Law Centres Case Study; Legal Aid in China. 
42 See Annex F: Community-based Paralegals Case Study; Namati Sector-Specific Paralegals in Myanmar. 
43 See Annex F: Microfinancing Justice Case Study; Microjusticia Argentina. 
44 See Annex F: National Community Law Centres Case Study; Maisons d’Accès à la Justice in Rwanda. 
45See Annex F: Microfinancing Justice Case Study; Microjustice4All. 
46 See Annex F: National Hybrid Models Case Study; Community Advice Offices in South Africa. 
47 See Annex F: National Hybrid Models Case Study; Community Legal Centres in Ukraine. 
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of a hybrid model of service delivery that will include Sierra Leone’s new Legal Aid Board delivering 
more traditional forms of legal representation. 
A Typology of Basic Legal Services 
 We consider it helpful for the purposes of this report to categorise the agreed interventions into a 
simple typology, recognising that although it does not capture the full nuances of the reality, it does 
provide a useful tool of analysis, demonstrating that interventions can sit along a spectrum which 
can involve greater and lesser degrees of state-ownership, funding and sustainability. The typology, 
which covers a range of countries in LIC and MIC income brackets (see Annex E of Volume 2  for 
categorisation) and includes a short summary of each intervention (longer descriptions being 
available in the form of country case studies at Annex F of Volume 2), comprises five categories as 
follows: 
1. Community-based paralegals 
 The growing use in recent years of paralegals that work closely with communities parallels the 
greater emphasis on community health workers in the health sector in that it offers the potential 
of low cost and high return together with the potential to link up the informal and formal sectors.  
However, models of paralegalism can face challenges in relation to service quality and sustainability 
when taken to scale as investment can be delivered by donors outside of government, without 
sufficient training and oversight and for a limited period.  LIC/MIC examples of this model, which 
include pilots that have sought to develop systems for training and oversight and sources of 
government funding to put themselves on a long-term footing, are: 
 Liberia’s Community Justice Advisors:48 Community Justice Advisors provide free legal 
information, civic education, mediation services and referrals across 7 of Liberia’s fifteen 
counties.  They are based in the offices of the Catholic Church Justice and Peace Commission 
in larger towns and travel regularly by motorbike to remote communities where they conduct 
mobile clinics.  Three offices across the country staffed by lawyers support the paralegals.   
 Myanmar’s Land Paralegals:49 Namati works with the Myanmar-based Civil and Political 
Rights Campaign Group to fund 30 paralegals that work with individuals to resolve land 
problems across 150 village tracts in seven states.  Data is also collected to inform advocacy 
strategies in the area of land reform.  Funding is presently provided by DFID, Omidyar and 
OSF and the project plans to scale up to 90 paralegals working across a total of 500 village 
tracts. 
 Sierra Leone’s Community-based Paralegals:50 TIMAP for Justice’s community-based 
paralegal scheme began in 2003 as a joint initiative of Open Society Justice Initiative and the 
                                                          
48 See Annex F: Microfinancing Justice Case Study; Legal Aid Clinics in Bangladesh. 
49 See Annex F: Community-based Paralegals Case Study; Namati Sector-Specific Paralegals in Myanmar. 
50 See Annex F: Community-based Paralegals Case Study; TIMAP for Justice and Others in Sierra Leone. 
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Sierra Leonean National Forum for Human Rights as a response to the chronic shortage of 
lawyers following the conflict.  Between 2009 and 2011, OSJI worked with TIMAP, the 
Government of Sierra Leone, the World Bank, BRAC, Access to Justice Law Centre, MCSL and 
JPC to develop a national approach to community-based paralegalism, working through local 
partners to expand 13 offices serving 16% of the population to 19 offices serving 38% of the 
population. Namati has since been continuing the scale up, reaching a total of 29 offices, but 
the project has recently come to an end with Namati now focusing on land and 
environmental problems. 
2. Microfinancing Justice 
 In recent years, models of basic legal service provision have begun to explore the possibilities of 
cross-subsidisation from private sector activities. This may come in the form of achieving cost 
savings by co-locating service provision with a private sector entity or it may come in the form of 
generating new revenue streams by providing legal services to private sector entities or indeed by 
providing them with other services such as microfinance.  While these models appear scalable, their 
reliance on private sector rather than government support may present challenges for sustainability 
in the long-term.  Examples of these models include: 
 Bangladesh’s BRAC-run Human Rights and Legal Aid Services (HRLS) programme:51 The 
programme operates 512 legal clinics in 61 of 64 districts across Bangladesh and is the largest 
NGO-led legal aid programme in the world.  The work of the clinics takes place at three levels 
– district, upazilla and union – and includes legal education, community mobilisation with 
village leaders and legal advice, ADR and court representation.  At each level, activities are 
carried out by a range of staff and volunteers who are a mixture of lawyers and non-lawyers. 
Although donors still provide a significant amount of funding to HRLS, there is an element of 
cross-subsidy with funds from BRAC’s social enterprise work with microfinance, dairy, 
poultry, fisheries, arts and crafts and partly funded by a USD 0.13 client fee which aims to 
ensure buy-in and fund the volunteer lawyers. 
 Bolivia, Peru, Kenya and Croatia/Serbia’s Microjustice4All network:52 Microjustice4All is a 
Dutch organisation that helps to set up and coordinate a network of programmes that 
provide basic legal services out of private or voluntary sector locations that pre-exist for the 
provision of other services e.g. in Kenya out of church organisations and community chiefs’ 
compounds and in Bolivia out of microfinance offices which produces rapid economies of 
scale.  Services are typically provided by paralegals and law students under the supervision 
of experienced lawyers in return for affordable fees which provide an element of cost 
recovery.  Most services focus on legal documentation in relation to identity documents, 
                                                          
51 See Annex F: Microfinancing Justice Case Study; Legal Aid Clinics in Bangladesh. 
52 See Annex F: Microfinancing Justice Case Study; Microjustice4All. 
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property, income generation, family law and inheritance issues and specific contexts like 
natural disasters. 
 Argentina’s Microjusticia:53 Fundacion Microjusticia Argentina provides documentation 
services in particular, operating out of branches of either microfinance institutions, such as 
FIE Gran Poder or Alumbra (Banco Macro), or NGOs which keeps costs at a minimum.  Legal 
services are provided by volunteer lawyers and law students supervised by full-time trained 
tutors and are provided free of charge to end users. Microjusticia charges a fee to 
microfinance institutions, NGOs, law firms, law schools and not-for-profits interested in CSR 
opportunities for their lawyers or offering Microjusticia’s legal services to their beneficiaries 
as an additional service. 
3. National Community Law Centres 
 National community law centres provide the full range of basic legal services in every geographic 
sub-division of a country of an appropriate size. They can differ from community-based paralegals 
in offering less in the way of mobile service delivery and in being more integrated into state 
infrastructure (although they may or may not be fully-funded by government) – although some 
centres of this kind can offer community-based paralegals as one of their services. The Citizens 
Advice Bureaus of the UK are an example.54  LIC/MIC examples of these models include: 
 China’s Legal Aid Centres:55 the People’s Republic of China runs over 3,500 legal aid centres 
nationwide down to county level. These offer a full range of legal aid services from advice-
giving to legal representation. In addition there are over 50,000 legal aid ‘information points’ 
at village level. This is further supported by a national legal aid hotline which enables people 
to obtain free legal advice anywhere at any time. Funding is provided from the Government 
(central, provincial and county-level) and the national Legal Aid Foundation, a body 
established by the 2003 State Council Legal Aid Regulation which disburses lottery funds and 
contributions received from the private sector. Some provinces have also established their 
own Legal Aid Foundations which perform a similar function.  Legal aid services are provided 
by lawyers in private practice, legal workers (paralegals), and representatives of social 
organisations and NGOs providing legal aid. 
 Rwanda’s Maison d’Accès à la Justice:56 there are 30 Maison d’Accès à la Justice across 
Rwanda – one in each of the country’s 30 districts. Each centre is staffed by three lawyers 
that provide legal information and education, advice and representation, train mediators, 
disseminate laws and act as a link with government by identifying and seeking to resolve 
pending legal cases. The centres deal primary with civil matters and are coordinated by the 
                                                          
53 See Annex F: Microfinancing Justice Case Study; Microjusticia Argentina. 
54 See Annex F: OECD Case Study; Basic Legal Service Provision in England and Wales. 
55 See Annex F: National Community Law Centres Case Study; Legal Aid in China. 
56 See Annex F: National Community Law Centres Case Study; Maisons d’Accès à la Justice in Rwanda. 
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Access to Justice Department in the Ministry of Justice and funded by the Government of 
Rwanda with UNDP support.   
4. National Hybrid Models 
 Other models of basic legal service provision involve service provision of this kind, very often 
overseen and/or part-funded by the state, as part of a much wider system of legal service delivery 
by the state. The dual-functionality of the Legal Aid Ontario57 (which provides both traditional legal 
representation and basic legal services) and the two-tier approach of the Legal Aid Board and Legal 
Service Counters in the Netherlands58 (which provide these two types of service delivery 
respectively) are OECD examples.  LIC/MIC examples of these models include: 
 South Africa’s Community Advice Offices:59 the Government of South Africa funds Legal Aid 
South Africa which is an independent statutory body that runs 32 Justice Centres that provide 
advice, referrals and litigation on civil and criminal matters throughout the country and 
Community Advice Offices which are not-for-profit centres that offer basic legal advice and 
information. Each Justice Centre is home to a number of attorneys and paralegals.  CAOs 
typically consist of one or two paralegals plus volunteers with some legal knowledge 
 Ukraine’s Community Legal Centres:60 the Ukrainian Government funds 125 regional centres 
which provide secondary legal aid in the form of direct representation and other legal 
services.  Primary legal aid in the form of advice and information is provided by more than 30 
Community Law Centres that are run by NGOs, and funded by local municipalities and donors 
and operate in 20 regions. Some Centres operate mobile clinics and use Skype to reach 
geographically isolated citizens. Services offered vary with the needs of the local community. 
5. Justice Hubs 
 Advances in technology have enabled basic legal services to be provided remotely, reducing the 
need for a physical presence in different geographic regions of a country. Examples in OECD 
countries include LawAccess in New South Wales, Australia61 and Rechtwijzer in the Netherlands, 
suggesting that countries that have well-developed national hybrid models of legal service delivery, 
of which basic legal services are a part, are now exploring models of this kind.62 Questions, however, 
remain about the efficacy of such remote legal service provision in contrast to more traditional 
forms of face-to-face service provision but these fall to be balanced against the potential for cost 
savings. LIC/MIC examples of these models include: 
                                                          
57 See Annex F: OECD Case Study; Legal Aid and Community-based Legal Clinics in Canada. 
58 See Annex F: OECD Case Study; Legal Aid Counters and Online Dispute Resolution in the Netherlands. 
59 See Annex F: National Hybrid Models Case Study; Community Advice Offices in South Africa. 
60 See Annex F: National Hybrid Models Case Study; Community Legal Centres in Ukraine. 
61 See Annex F: OECD Case Study; Legal Aid and Justice Hubs in Australia. 
62 See Annex F: OECD Case Study; Legal Aid, Counters and Online Dispute Resolution in the Netherlands. See Annex F: Justice 
Hubs and Hybrids Case Study; Legal Aid Centres, Community Justice Centres and Mobile Law in Kenya. 
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 Kenya’s M-Sheria Project:63 M-Sheria is run by Kituo Cha Sheria, a human rights NGO that 
operates a legal aid centre based in Nairobi and seven community justice centres run by 
community-based paralegals. Initial advice and referrals to volunteer advocates are provided 
on issues relating to land, labour, housing and inheritance. M-Sheria allows users to text a 
legal question to the M-Sheria website which is maintained by a group of about 500 pro bono 
lawyers who answer the questions through the provision of initial advice on the website and 
more detailed advice which is texted back to the person as well. 
 Uganda’s Barefoot Law:64 Barefoot Law provide access to legal information, guidance and 
support through multiple platforms, including web based and mobile phone technology, as 
well as more traditional face-to-face and telephone interaction. Mobile phones cost USD 7-8 
(USD 30-40 for smartphones) and ownership is approximately 70% of the population (8% for 
smartphones). Services include referral to pro bono legal service providers, Virtual Counsel 
via Skype, the provision of template legal documents and legal consultations, education and 
ADR via social media. Some 300,000 people are reached per month by a team of 10 legal 
volunteers and a technical specialist. The project hopes to go to scale and has recently 
obtained seed funding to invest in a platform to provide a suite of user-funded services 
specific to SMEs. 
 
 Table 1 illustrates this simplified typography of basic legal services, comparing and contrasting key 
characteristics of basic legal service intervention. 
Table 1: Key Characteristics and Typography of Basic Legal Service Intervention Case Studies 
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63 See Annex F: Justice Hubs and Hybrids Case Study; Legal Aid Centres, Community Justice Centres and Mobile Law in Kenya.  
64 See Annex F: Justice Hubs and Hybrids Case Study; Online and Mobile Law in Uganda.  
Developing a portfolio of financially sustainable, scalable, basic legal service models 
Final Report, 18 December 2015 
Page 24 of 92 
 





















on land and 
environmenta
l justice  
Community 
level and rural 








OSJI and GIZ); 
state funding 
enshrined in 












level and rural 
– 517 clinics 







fee; model of 
cross-
subsidisation 
BRAC is the 
largest NGO 

























































and labour  
Urban and 



































to basic rights 
Developing a portfolio of financially sustainable, scalable, basic legal service models 
Final Report, 18 December 2015 
Page 25 of 92 
 





















































d’Accès à la 
Justice 
Wide range of 
issues 
District level – 
one legal 
centre per 








































































































Developing a portfolio of financially sustainable, scalable, basic legal service models 
Final Report, 18 December 2015 
Page 26 of 92 
 














Justice hubs Kenya’s M-
Sheria Project 

















Models from Other Sectors Delivering Basic Services  
 We have also considered models from the health and education sectors which loosely lend 
themselves to a similar typology: 
 Community-based health workers and teachers: 
o In Pakistan, some 90,000 female community-health workers deliver cost-effective 
interventions in material and child health and refer patients to the nearest basic health clinic.  
Health workers are elected by the community and are provided with 15 months training from 
the local government health facility before she is paid USD 345 per year to operate out of her 
home to cover 200 households with monthly visits. Funding and supervision is provided by 
the Ministry of Health.65 
o El Salvador’s EDUCO programme involves parents and teachers in the governance of each 
school through a community association whose members are elected every three years by 
the community. Associations are responsible for hiring and firing teachers, managing funds 
and monitoring teacher performance. EDUCO schools have worse infrastructure and less 
experienced teachers than traditional schools but more educated teachers and more 
textbooks per child. The per capita cost is about USD 85 per child compared with USD 73 per 
child in a traditional primary school. Funding comes from the World Bank and the Ministry of 
Education.66 
 Microfinancing health and education: 
o In Bolivia, Microfinance Institution CRECER provides loans of on average USD 150 to 15--20 
members which are repaid over 16 or 24 weeks. All banks meet on a weekly or biweekly basis 
where members make repayments, deposit loans and receive training on financial and 
business management as well as child and reproductive health. There is a community-based 
distribution system for contraceptives, referrals are offered to rural clinics and health 
                                                          
65 Zhu, N. et al. (2014). ‘Lady Health Workers in Pakistan’. Harvard School of Public Health. 
66 Birdsall, N., Levine, R. & Ibrahim, A. (2005).  ‘Towards Universal Primary Education: Investments, Incentives and Institutions’.  
UN Millennium Project Task Force on Education and Gender Equality.  
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campaigns promote vaccinations and PAP smear campaigns.67 Funding is mainly provided by 
a mixture of donors and investment funds. 
o BRAC runs an education programme in Bangladesh for children that are not reached by the 
formal education system, delivering literacy and numeracy in 3-4 years with flexible hours 
that allow children to help their parents on the fields or at home. There are no school fees 
and schools provide all supplies (which makes the cost to parents less than government 
schools despite the unit costs of education being similar) but at least 70% of students must 
be girls. In 1996, there were some 35,000 schools all over the country. Funding is provided 
by donors and BRAC’s own funds from income-generating activities. 
 National health clinics and primary schools: 
o Kenya: LifeNet International is a not-for-profit which partners with church-based community 
health centres and franchises them to build their medical and administrative capacity and 
connect them with pharmaceuticals and equipment with lending where necessary. The 
average LifeNet clinic currently services 1200 patients a month and the organisation plans to 
operate 1000 centres in ten East African countries by 2025.68  Funding is largely provided by 
private philanthropists. 
o Omega Schools in Ghana is a for profit entity that presently runs 38 schools educating 20,000 
students. A daily (rather than yearly) fee of USD 0.65 includes tuition, hot lunch, books, two 
sets of uniforms, mid and end of term assessment, health insurance etc. The fee structure 
caters for the income volatility of its target client base while the fee level matches the out-
of-pocket cost of attending a free government school with the result that there is no cost 
differential for parents who purchase the same extras at a government school. The 
associated Omega Foundation runs not-for-profit research and development on low cost 
business models and learning methods. The most recent investment is a £10m grant from 
Pearson.69 
 Hybrid health and education models: 
o India’s Karuna Trust runs a public private partnership managing 68 state-owned primary 
health centres in eight states and seven mobile health centre and three citizens help desks. 
The Trust resources government clinics with human resources and logistics to deliver better 
primary health services and enable each clinic to innovate in one area. The Trust has also 
offered community-based health insurance since 2002.70 It is primarily funded by the 
Government of India with some additional funds provided by UNDP and other donors. 
                                                          
67 UNFPA (2012) From Microfinance to Macro Change: Integrating Health Education and Microfinance to Empower Women and 
Reduce Poverty.  
68 http://www.lninternational.org/  
69 http://www.omega-schools.com  
70 http://healthmarketinnovations.org/program/karuna-trust  
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o In Niger, local school councils or COGES in Niger are monitored at two levels: federations 
which principally monitor COGES and forums above them at which multiple stakeholders 
from different federations can come together to discuss issues of common interest. This 
ensures monitoring and oversight places as little burden as possible on COGES officers who 
can focus on educational administration.71 Funding is provided principally by the Government 
of Niger. 
 Heath and education hubs: 
o India offers Mera Doctor, a health hotline which reaches 19 states and 40,000 clients and 
addresses 400 ailments and ReMeDi which offers remote diagnostic capability to 40 countries 
of which India is only one.72 The former has raised funds from angel investors such as Accion 
International to combine with some donor investment; the latter is funded primarily by 
revenue from users. 
o BRIDGE Academies in Kenya is a for profit entity which runs 300 low-cost private schools 
serving over 100,00 students using Academy in a Box which involves a cookie-cutter approach 
to infrastructure and scripted lessons disseminated from handheld computers which are 
linked to a central system. This enables each Academy to be managed by a single employee. 
In 2014, the cost of schooling was USD 6 per month so 70% lower than other private schools 
and affordable to 85-95% of families.73 Investors include Pearson Affordable Learning Fund, 
CDC, IFC, Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg. 
Cross-Sector Observations  
 In seeking to distil lessons from the scaling up of basic health and education services, it is important 
to consider the similarities and differences between these service sectors as they affect the 
applicability of those lessons to the justice sector. 
 The similarities between basic legal services and basic healthcare and education services which 
reinforce the value of looking at these other sectors as a source of lessons include: 
 Supply and demand constraints in the form of a lack of skilled service providers on the supply 
side and a lack of understanding of the service on the demand side due to information 
asymmetries which can be particularly acute among certain segments of the population.74 
                                                          
71 Honda, S. and Kato, H. ‘Scaling Up in Education: School-Based Management in Niger’ in Chandy et al. (2013). ‘Getting to Scale: 
How to Bring Development Solutions to Millions of Poor People’. 
72 ISCF and University of Toronto.  (2015).  ‘Rapid Routes to Scale, Scaling up Primary Care to Improve Health in Low and Middle 
Income Countries’. 
73 BRIDGE International Academies at http://www.bridgeinternationalacademies.com  
74 ISCF and University of Toronto.  (2015). ‘Rapid Routes to Scale, Scaling up Primary Care to Improve Health in Low and Middle 
Income Countries’. 
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 Market and government failure in the sense of reflecting both a public and a private good 
element which means the market incentive to deliver the goods is distorted.75  
 Potential to confront entrenched social norms where dealing, for example, with girl’s 
education, reproductive health issues or with gender-based violence can create a disincentive 
to provide services. 
 Highly discretionary and transaction-intensive services are difficult to standardise and 
therefore to deliver at scale, particularly given the variation in needs of particular groups, as well 
as being difficult to monitor results. 
 Strong bargaining power from well-organised professional groups with a high degree of 
autonomy deriving from their monopoly over complex technical skills. 
 Financing dilemmas - scale up at the primary service level involves potentially nationwide 
provision which can most obviously be provided by government, but given the funding 
constraints faced by governments in developing countries, this is not always possible. 
 Tertiary focus - in justice, just as in education and health, there is a tendency for donor resources 
to be captured by the tertiary sector, for example, through the training of the judiciary and the 
provision of law libraries when the most cost effective interventions may be at the primary level 
i.e. at the entry points for the poor to the justice system. 
 However, there are also differences between basic legal services and health and education which 
are relevant to the government institutionalisation and financing of these services and which limit 
the utility of lessons from these other sectors. These differences include: 
 Constraints on state power which can result from the provision of basic legal services where 
users direct those services against the state – the fact that basic legal services create avenues 
for citizens to hold states to account can create a disincentive for elites to provide those services. 
 Coordination failures arising from the delivery of justice being the product of a number of 
ministries in a government with overlapping/unclear mandates (for example, the Supreme 
Court, the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General’s Office or Prosecution Service) which 
can lead to an inability to access central government funds for budget allocations to basic legal 
service provision as well as inter-ministerial competition for those resources. 
 Overlapping, plural systems with traditional or religious systems, some of which may be 
formally recognised by the state and may have greater legitimacy with communities and easier 
access than the state providers then exist alongside. There are some similarities to the health 
sector where formal health care providers exist alongside traditional methods of healing.  
                                                          
75 Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. (2008). ‘Making the Law Work for Everyone’, Working Group Reports (Vol. 2).  
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 Identification of demand can be difficult as unlike, for example, access to water or education, 
an individual may not be able to state ex ante whether or not they have access to justice services 
or which kind.76  
 Functional complexity of basic legal services compared with primary schooling or healthcare 
can make it difficult to achieve transformative change as scaling up often requires a trade-off or 
balance between reach and breadth; i.e. the number of people reached by a narrow service, or 
the transformational impact achieved by a broader range of services. The easiest things to 
transform to a large scale are therefore generally very simple, like school meals or vaccinations 
for particular diseases, but to maximise the benefits, services need to be targeted.  
 Heterogeneity of need means that basic legal services need to be highly context-specific and 
variable, according to the particular characteristics of legal problem and the person, unlike other 
successfully scaled services such as water sanitation, vaccination or oral rehydration therapy 
which presents challenges for scaling up. 
 There are also differences between basic legal services and health and education which are relevant 
to the alternative (non-government) financing of these services. These differences include: 
 The relative certainty of cost and outcome of basic education services. 
 The extreme urgency of some basic health services. 
 The relative frequency and predictability of basic education and health needs. 
 The identity of the end user is perhaps more frequently juvenile in the context of education and 
health needs compared with basic legal needs. 
 But perhaps the most significant difference is the lack of heterogeneity of need and service 
provision in the context of basic legal services, the result of which is that unbundling services is 
most likely to enable particular service categories to be identified which are similar to education 
and/or health and to which lessons from those sectors can be applied, for example: 
 Birth registration: this could be said to share the certainty of cost and outcome which education 
demonstrates. 
 Domestic violence: this could be said to share the urgency of need which health demonstrates. 
                                                          
76 Ibid. 
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Chapter 3:      What do we know about the unit costs of basic legal 
services and how we can calculate them? 
Methodology 
 Quantifying the unit costs of specific interventions providing basic legal services is central to 
understanding the cost of scaling up service provision, whether to the entire population of a country 
or some smaller sub-category of individuals. However, in order to properly understand the 
effectiveness of interventions and their value for money so as to make a case for financing that 
cost, costs need to be considered alongside benefits to develop a picture of net benefit. 
 There are at least two distinct approaches to determining the unit cost of legal service provision:   
 Costing a national justice system from the top down; or 
 Costing a particular aspect of legal service delivery from the bottom up.   
 The first approach (as to which see the description set out at Annex G of Volume 2) is more holistic, 
but inevitably encompasses criminal justice as a large proportion of the workload of the national 
justice system. For the purposes of this research, in order to keep the focus on basic legal service 
provision in the context of legal problems of a civil and administrative nature, we adopt the second 
costing approach. 
 A key benefit of the bottom up approach is that it allows us to identify the variety and scale of legal 
needs in a country – including whether any particular groups have particular needs – together with 
a pilot intervention that is seeking to meet those needs and to cost upwards the cost of scaling up 
that intervention to meet those needs nationally. 
 In contrast, one of the values of the top down approach to costing is that it has the potential to help 
the justice sector to establish a much stronger case for funding from both governments and donors 
for interventions such as the scale up of basic legal services. This is the approach increasingly 
adopted by other sectors. Other sectors have developed models that identify costs in terms of (a) 
% of GDP or government spend and (b) the per capita cost. For example:  
 As part of the Global Monitoring Report on education that has been running for some years 
UNESCO have costed the delivery of primary and secondary education. In their latest report 
(2015) this was costed at an average of USD 47 per capita in LDCs. They also urged countries 
to target total spending on education at 6% of GDP and/or 20% of the government’s budget.77   
                                                          
77 Manuel et al ODI Working paper 416 http://www.odi.org/publications/9462-financing-future-international-public-finance-
should-fund-global-social-compact-eradicate-poverty 
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 The first global costing for essential health care services was prepared in 2003 by the Global 
Commission. The most recent update was undertaken by the Centre on Global Health at 
Chatham House which costed the delivery of universal health care at USD 87 per capita in LICs 
and they recommend a target of spending on health of 5% of GDP. Many African countries 
have subscribed to the Maputo target of 15% of government expenditure.78 
Such benchmarking facilitates an assessment of spending on justice relative to other services such 
as health and education which can tell a valuable story about the prioritisation of justice relative to 
those other services domestically. When considered in the context of figures on GDP and 
government expenditure more generally, such benchmarking also provides valuable information 
about government resources in general. This information can assist in identifying countries with 
limited revenue capacity which may not be able to finance basic legal service provision in the short-
term,79 and countries where the constraint is prioritisation rather than affordability. 
 In recognition of the complementarity of the bottom-up and the top-down approaches to costing, 
we have adopted a simple bottom up approach in combination with some very initial benchmarking 
using the scaled up unit costs of a limited number of country examples. Comparing these costs to 
government revenue and spending on the judiciary allows us to develop a picture of the 
affordability of government financing scale-up. 
 There are four steps to the costing methodology we have devised. In our application of this 
methodology to case study countries, we have not always been able to apply all four steps due to 
lack of data. However, we set out the methodology here in full to inform the discussion on how to 
cost the scale up of basic legal services and future data collection. 
Step 1: Determining Input Costs 
 When considering the costs of delivering a model of basic legal service provision, there are at least 
three categories of costs to consider:80 
 Monetary costs which on a micro-level may include lawyers’ or paralegals’ fees, experts’ and 
expert witness fees, filing fees, translator fees, bailiff’s fees, notary fees, services for summons, 
discovery related costs, travel expenses, costs for communication, and copying and other 
overheads and on a macro-level may include the cost of regulating the legal profession.81 
                                                          
78 Ibid 
79 See, by analogy, the recent ODI study which has identified those countries that cannot afford basic national healthcare or 
education systems by comparing estimate of revenue capacity against cost of service provision: ibid.  
80 Tilburg Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies of Civil Law and Conflict Resolution Systems (2009).  Handbook for Measuring the 
Costs and Quality of Access to Justice, p.29. 
81 Ibid, pp.30-31. 
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 Opportunity costs which are on a micro-level the resources users of justice spend on their paths 
to justice, such as missed opportunities, time and foregone earnings and on a macro-level the 
resources spent on basic legal services that could be spent on other services or projects.82   
 Intangible costs which are on a micro-level the amount of stress, emotion and damage to 
relationships associated with a given path to justice, including from perceived unfair results, and 
on a macro-level the delays in case resolution through the formal system and perceptions of its 
transparency.83  
 Since the monetary costs to users are often free in donor-funded basic legal service interventions 
and since there is a paucity of data available in relation to opportunity and intangible costs, the 
costs of basic legal service provision discussed in the case studies are mostly approximated using 
the input costs e.g. the annual operating budget of a community legal centre or number of 
paralegals.  
Step 2: Determining Size of Community Served 
 There are a number of tools and methods for estimating the reach of service provision or the size 
of the community served, none of which are a perfect science: 
 Legal needs surveys: data from these surveys can be used to identify the proportion of the 
population with a basic legal service problem across a particular geographic area or across the 
population as a whole. If there is no current provision of basic legal services then this can be 
used to inform the level of provision needed; if there is existing provision, it can be used to 
identify the ‘justice gap’.84 
 Case capacity: data on the number of cases handled by a community justice adviser or centre 
can be used to understand how many cases can be handed over a particular time period.  This 
can then be combined with legal needs data to identity the number of service providers needed 
to service the relevant legal needs. The challenge of this approach is that case handling is only 
one aspect of basic legal service provision, which often includes legal awareness and education, 
the reach of which goes well beyond an individual client such that focusing solely on cases is 
likely to overestimate cost and underestimate benefit. 
 Geographic reach: data on the number of people that can walk to a community justice adviser 
or center is a non-case-based way of assessing reach.  However, this approach fails to reflect the 
capacity of service providers who may have no ability to serve additional members of the 
community, despite being within a certain geographic area. 
                                                          
82 Ibid, pp.31-33. 
83 Ibid, pp.33-34. 
84 Legal Service Corporation (2009). Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The current unmet civil legal needs of law-income 
Americans. 
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 The most robust approach to determining catchment area in the context of basic legal service 
provision is likely to be a combination of the above approaches.  For example, in many of the case 
studies we have considered, data is only available on a per case basis. The key analytical challenge 
is then how to estimate the number of cases that need to be handled at a national level each year. 
Fortunately an increasing number of countries have undertaken an assessment of legal needs. The 
results of these surveys are summarised in Figure 1 below and Appendix 2. The surveys for the three 
low income and lower middle income countries (Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Ukraine) suggest 2-3% 
of the population have a “very important” legal need each year. The estimates for High 
Income/OECD countries are slightly higher at 3-12%. As the only countries in this study that are 
lacking legal needs surveys are low/lower middle income countries their unit cost analysis is based 
on the conservative assumption of annual demand being 2% of the population, implying each case 
is covering the legal needs of 50 people. It remains the case that this figure is likely to be an 
underestimate, given the focus on cases as a method of meeting legal needs to the exclusion of 
other activities by paralegals and other service providers. 
Figure 1: Legal needs -- percentage of population requiring support in a year 
 
 
 Once the input costs for a model of service provision have been determined and together with the 
size of the community to be served, the unit or per capita cost of service provision can then be 
estimated. The advantage of this approach is that in focusing on the unit as each individual served, 
rather than a community justice adviser, community legal clinic or other unit, cross-country 
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Step 3: Determining Benefits 
 Just as with costs, there are a variety of different categories of benefit to consider in the context of 
basic legal service provision:85 
 Quality of procedure which on a micro-level may involve assessing people’s perceptions 
regarding the fairness, accuracy and consistency of the procedure and the ability of individuals 
to participate within it86 and may have societal benefits at the macro-level also such as greater 
adherence to the law. 
 Quality of outcomes which on a micro-level may involve assessing people’s perceptions 
regarding the distribution of compensation or other monetary outcomes, the repair of 
emotional harm through the use of victim statements and apologies, punishment of offenders 
through various types of sentences and opportunities for reconciliation87 but again may have 
societal benefits at the macro-level such as a sense of security, empowerment and social 
cohesion. 
 Survey data is key to capturing micro-level benefits. One type of survey that might be employed is 
a willingness to pay (WTP)/willingness to accept (WTA) survey. Such an approach asks service users 
what they would be willing to pay to have the service provided and how much they would be willing 
to accept not having the service provided. The WTP and WTA approach has been widely used to 
cost intangible benefits of interventions, including in evaluations of environmental, health, and 
safety practices (as an alternative to the quality adjusted life years measure). However, the 
relationship between income levels or purchasing power and WTP or WTA can be problematic, 
particularly if cross-country comparisons are to be drawn. In the context of basic legal service 
provision, service users would likely be asked how much they would be willing to pay by way of 
annual fee to maintain a particular level of service provision e.g. a community legal centre staffed 
by two paralegals offering the full range of basic legal services within 5km. 
 At the macro-level, arguably existing quantitative datasets could be analysed as a proxy for macro-
level benefits. For example, trends in the caseload handled by the formal justice system could be 
considered a proxy for the societal benefits brought about by the early prevention qualities of basic 
legal service provision – although it is also possible that ‘legal sensitisation’ might contribute to 
increased use of formal legal channels by individuals to solve disputes.  However, trends reflecting 
a reduction in caseload in the formal justice system do not obviously capture outcomes among 
traditional justice providers and on their own are unlikely to tell a story about causality, thus they 
                                                          
85 Tilburg Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies of Civil Law and Conflict Resolution Systems (2009).  Handbook for Measuring the 
Costs and Quality of Access to Justice, p.29. 
86 Tilburg Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies of Civil Law and Conflict Resolution Systems (2009).  Handbook for Measuring the 
Costs and Quality of Access to Justice, pp.34-36 
87 Tilburg Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies of Civil Law and Conflict Resolution Systems (2009).  Handbook for Measuring the 
Costs and Quality of Access to Justice, pp.36-39 
Developing a portfolio of financially sustainable, scalable, basic legal service models 
Final Report, 18 December 2015 
Page 36 of 92 
 
are best analysed in the context of a treatment and non-treatment group or at least alongside 
qualitative data which ideally considers the informal sector as well. 
 Due to a lack of data availability, it has not been possible to incorporate benefit data into our 
analysis of unit costs.  However, two of our case studies (South Africa and Queensland, Australia) 
discuss studies where this type of data has been incorporated. 
Step 4: Scaling up and Benchmarking 
 Once the input costs, size of the community served and benefits of a model of basic legal service 
provision have been estimated to produce a unit cost per capita, it is relatively straight forward to 
scale this up by population size to estimate the costs and benefits of service provision to the entire 
population, but the linearity of such an approach masks the nuances and complexity of real world 
situations. Capacity issues and potential economies of scale should be considered to scale up more 
realistically, as should the notion that extending coverage to the hardest to reach populations may 
actually involve diseconomies of scale and therefore higher unit costs of service provision.  
 The scale up cost gives the size of the funding required for national provision of basic legal services.  
However, it is by benchmarking the unit cost per capita against measures of the economy, 
government resource and spending prioritisation that it is possible to determine the government’s 
prioritisation of justice relative to other sectors and the affordability of funding basic legal services 
to them.  For example: 
 GDP per capita contextualises scale up costs relative to the size of the economy; 
 Total government revenues per capita situates the cost of scale up within the resources 
available to government; 
 Spending on justice/judiciary per capita contextualises basic legal services as part of overall 
spending on justice as a % GDP spent on health and education; and 
 Share of the budget spent on justice/judiciary88 compared to share allocated to other sectors 
such as health and education assess the prioritisation of justice and spend on non-basic civil and 
administrative legal services and criminal legal services generally. 
                                                          
88 Note that there are a spectrum of budget lines which may be included under the umbrella of the justice sector including from 
funding to Ministries of Justice, Supreme Courts or courts and tribunal services, Attorney General’s offices and Home 
Departments where they have responsibility for police and prisons.  While only a proportion of the overall funding to the justice 
sector will target legal problems of a civil and administrative nature, and therefore be directly relevant to the provision of basic 
legal services, the functioning of the entire legal system, including spend on enforcement mechanisms such as the police, is 
essential for effective legal service provision at all levels. However, for the purposes of simplicity, in this report, we have focused 
on funding to the judiciary only. 
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Applying the Methodology to the Typology: Unit Costs of Basic Legal Service 
Models 
 In order to demonstrate the methodology discussed above and capture what we know about unit 
costs, in what follows, we have applied the methodology discussed to a selection of country case 
studies below.89  Where possible, we have also calculated scale-up costs and benchmarked these 
against country-level data.90  Further details from the findings are at Appendices 2 and 3. 
1. Community-based paralegals 
Liberia: A Range of Approaches to Cost 
 The average yearly Carter Center operating budget between 2010 and 2014 was USD 447,095, and 
The Carter Center had an average annual case intake of 1272 cases in that time period. This 
produces a crude unit cost of USD 351 per case handled using a case capacity approach.91 
Attributing programme cost to both cases handled and the estimated 241,638 people sensitised or 
trained provides a unit cost of USD 1.85 per person directly interacted with.92  Using a geographic 
reach approach produces numbers that are different again, 52 community justice advisers having 
worked for the Carter Center in 2014 serving ten communities each, with an average population 
reached an estimated 575,329 people at a unit cost of USD 0.78 per capita.93 The differences in 
these figures demonstrate the impact of different approaches to catchment size.94 
 As to benefits, just over 60% of clients travel less than one kilometre to obtain the service sought 
and the majority of clients learned about services through awareness campaigns and word of 
mouth, both of which are potentially proxy measures of service quality.95 There is also more direct 
data on outcomes: over 70% of cases were resolved with the help of a community justice adviser, 
15% were not resolved, three per cent were resolved without the help of an adviser and 10% had 
unknown outcomes.  Successful mediation also resolved 44% of cases handled.96  
 The estimated cost of scaling up current provision to a population of 4.4m is USD 3.4m.  
                                                          
89 While the majority of cost estimates in the case studies are based on primary data collected specifically for this study, some 
summarise secondary data and published studies. 
90 Data on government expenditure on the health and education sector is sourced from the World Development Indicators and 
data on expenditure on the judiciary is based on national budget publications. 
91 Email from Tom Crick at the Carter Center, 18 December 2015. 
92 Ibid.. 
93 Ibid.. 
94 We note that these figures also suggest that Liberia has legal need in the region of a tenth of its level in Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone: see Appendix 2.   
95 Ibid, pp.5-7. 
96 Ibid, p.10. 
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Myanmar: Namati Sector Specific Scale Up Estimate 
 In the first 16 months of implementation, Namati’s 30 paralegals working across 150 village tracts 
served 2,390 clients on cases affecting 7,992 people.97 While paralegals do not aim to serve their 
entire coverage area, but rather focus on critical cases, their presence improves rights protection 
for the catchment population as a whole through the provision of civic education and advocacy.  
 While benefits have not been fully assessed or quantified, indicative information is that the 
resolution rate for cases in the first six months was 86%, while the resolution rate for all cases, 
including recently opened cases, was 41%.98 We understand that early efforts have had substantial 
impact in securing land use certificates for famers, converting vacant land into farmland, and 
returning land to small-hold farmers. 
 In its medium term plan, Namati estimates that the land-focused paralegal service could be scaled 
up to serve one third of the rural population over the next five years. The total cost at that scale 
has been estimated at USD 3.75 million to cover 30 organisations with an annual operating budget 
of USD 125,000 each.99 The catchment size has been set at just over 13 million farmers, i.e. the 
targeted population, which provides a unit cost estimate of USD 0.28 per capita.100  We estimate 
that the cost of scaling up current provision to the entire population of 53m would be USD 15.5m. 
Sierra Leone: Namati National Scale Up Estimate 
 In 2005, each of TIMAP’s eight offices were handling an approximate average of 20 new cases per 
month,101 and the programme planned to expand its operations from five chiefdoms to ten with an 
annual budget of USD 260,000 to include salaries for two lawyers, 23 paralegals, vehicle costs and 
overheads. TIMAP estimated that 80% of cases were resolved successfully so of ten new cases per 
paralegal (two paralegals per office) per month, it was estimated that 2208 cases would be 
successfully resolved per year, producing a cost of USD 117.75 per resolution.102  Similarly, TIMAP 
estimated that the ten chiefdoms covered an area of approximately 736,000 people excluding 
Freetown, producing a programme cost of USD 0.34 per capita after a USD 10,000 discount for 
Freetown operations.103  By 2012, coverage of some 40% of the population of approximately five 
million was being achieved on a budget of USD 1million.104 
                                                          
97 Namati (draft), ‘Protecting Land Rights through Paralegal Services in Myanmar’. 
98 Ibid.  
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Maru V. (2006). ‘Between Law and Society: Paralegals and the Provision of Justice Services in Sierra Leone and Worldwide’, 
The Yale Journal of International Law. 
102 Ibid (2006). 
103 Ibid (2006).  
104 Internal Namati note (2012). 
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 As to benefits, in a World Bank evaluation of TIMAP, researchers selected 42 cases handled by the 
programme and interviewed all parties involved.105 The evaluation found that respondents were 
‘overwhelmingly positive’ about their experiences, the programme’s effectiveness in resolving 
difficult disputes and empowering its clients.  
 Namati has estimated that to provide paralegal services throughout the country it would cost USD 
2 million per year or USD 0.36 per capita, based on an office in most chiefdoms combined with a 
small corps of supervising lawyers.106  Our estimate is very similar. 
2.  Microfinancing Justice 
 
Argentina: Using A Case Multiplier  
 In 2014, Microjusticia Argentina had an annual operating budget of USD 28,054 and handled a total 
of 441 cases.107  This provides a crude unit cost estimate of USD 64 per case handled which is a 
substantial overestimate of the true cost per case as it does not account for the wider scope of the 
programme which has been expanding. This is evident from the fact that the operating budget of 
the programme substantially increased over the past three years (from USD 15,000 in 2013 to USD 
48,000 in 2015) while the case load remained roughly stable. On the basis of the standard 
assumption that the reach of a programme is approximately 50 times wider than the number of 
cases handled, the per capita cost would be approximately USD 1.3. 
 We have not seen data on the benefits of the Microjusticia Argentina programme but would expect 
these to include a reduction in case load in the formal justice system.  This is particularly so given 
the references in the legal needs survey to the slow resolution of cases and 80% of respondents 
indicating that outcomes are determined by wealth and power.108  We would also expect to see a 
wide range of socio-economic benefits to the people directly served as well as the wider 
community.  For example, the programme carries out substantial work in the area of obtaining 
formal documentation for clients, which enables them to seek formal employment and increase 
their income, receive social benefits, gain access to finance by opening bank accounts, receive 
student grants and complete their education, and participate in the democratic process.  
 Using a legal needs approach, the cost of scaling up current provision to a population of 43m is USD 
54.7m. 
                                                          
105 Dale, P. (2009). ‘Delivering Justice to Sierra Leone’s Poor: An Analysis of the Work of TIMAP for Justice’.  Justice for the Poor, 
World Bank. 
106 Maru V. and Gauri, V. (draft). ‘Bringing Law to Life: Community Paralegals and the Pursuit of Justice’.  
107 Email from Juan Bellocq at Microjusticia Argentina dated 14 October 2015 providing data in pesos and converted using an 
average exchange rate for 2014 of 0.105509. 
108 ACIJ (2013).  ‘Disadvantaged Communities, Rights and Access to Justice: A Study of Unmet Access to Justice’. 
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Bangladesh: Using a Case Multiplier 
 BRAC’s Human Rights and Legal Aid Services (HRLS) programme operates 512 legal aid clinics in 61 
of 64 districts across Bangladesh.109  In 2014 HRLS handled 6,161 court cases but from 2016 a cap 
on the total number of cases will be set at 5,000 per annum costing a total of USD 0.3 million to 
handle.110 On the basis that the clinics are almost district-wide, this is essentially a scale up cost 
albeit not one based on legal needs.   
 Nonetheless, to calculate the unit cost, limited data was available on costs and catchment size, the 
standard 50 people per case assumption was used, providing a crude unit cost estimate of USD 1.1. 
Since the cost estimate is based purely on the unit cost of representation at court, this is likely to 
be a substantial overestimate of the cost of basic legal service provisions (arguably representation 
at court does not even fall under the definition of basic and is the very high end of costs incurred in 
providing basic legal services). 
 As for benefits, as of April 2012, HRLS had received 175,205 complaints and resolved 94,804 
through ADR; 30,601 had been filed in court and 20,798 judgments received; and of these 15,734 
were in favour of BRAC clients and 2,301 were not.111  A total of over USD 9 million had also been 
secured by way of monetary compensation.112  Over 3.8 million women had been reached with legal 
education and 6000 shebikas (barefoot lawyers) and 8,300 odhikar shebis (community leaders) 
trained.113 Usage of the formal justice system is already low due to cost and complexity.114 
 Using a legal needs approach, the cost of scaling up current provision to a population of 159m is 
USD 181.8m 
3.       National Community Law Centres 
Rwanda: Using a Case Multiplier 
 MAJ has three lawyers per district, totalling 90 members of staff with an annual cost of USD 
800,000.115  Since the project is already present in each of the 30 districts, this is already the scale-
up cost albeit not one based on legal needs. However, the figure only includes the cost of staff 
salaries and does not cover additional administrative costs or overheads.   
 In 2013-14, MAJ received and provided legal aid to 22,168 cases, 90% of which were of a civil 
nature.116  The unit cost per case handled is therefore to USD 36.  However, to reflect the fact that 
                                                          
109 BRAC (2015). Human Rights and Legal Aid Services Programme available at http://hrls.brac.net/.  
110 Email from Sajeda Kabir, Programme Head of HRLS dated 26 October 2015. 
111 Kolisetty, A. (2014).  ‘Examining the Effectiveness of Legal Empowerment as a Pathway out of Poverty: A Case Study of BRAC, 




115 Government of Rwanda (2014). National Legal Aid Policy. Ministry of Justice.  
116 Government of Rwanda (2014). Ministry of Justice Annual Report 2013-2014. Ministry of Justice.  
Developing a portfolio of financially sustainable, scalable, basic legal service models 
Final Report, 18 December 2015 
Page 41 of 92 
 
MAJ reaches a wider community through advocacy and civic education, the standard multiplier of 
50 has been assumed to estimate the size of the community served from the number of cases 
handled, providing a unit cost of USD 0.7 per capita. 
 Survey data provides some indication of benefits: 30% of people sought legal advice on a matter in 
the last three years but only 7% of these from MAJs and indeed fewer than 4% of the population 
sampled know they can get legal advice from MAJ (though 27% know about them) but satisfaction 
levels are high (79% in 2014).117 
 Using a legal needs approach, the cost of scaling up current provision to a population of 11.3m is 
USD 8.1m 
4.       National Hybrid Models  
South Africa: Cost-Benefit Analysis in Action 
 The National Alliance for the Development of Community Advice Offices (NADCAO) has carried out 
a cost-benefit analysis of community advice offices.118 Costs of two idealised CAOs were estimated 
at R 500,000 and R 250, 000 or USD 46,000 and USD 23,000 based on the total project operating 
cost and the catchment size per office extrapolated from the number of users in the office on a 
sample of day (i.e. estimating the number of cases handled.   
 Costs were analysed against benefits which are quantified using a contingent willingness to pay 
approach asking what annual contribution users would make for the CAO (looking, for example, at 
the value accorded to a particular service received and the number of visits per year or asking what 
annual fee would be reasonable).119  The willingness to pay approach does not necessarily fully 
capture the benefits to the state of not having to provide similar services through state entities and 
preventing adverse consequences.120 So additionally, benefits were quantified in terms of a 
reduction in caseload for the national legal aid service. The potential additional caseload for the 
legal aid service was based on community advice centre users who indicated that they would have 
taken their problem to another government department or service if the office did not exist.121  
 The study finds that annual funding of USD 15,000 to 236 community advice offices would be 
strongly defendable from a value for money perspective as a core funding amount from the state 
                                                          
117 Rwanda Governance Board (2014). Rwanda Governance Scorecard.  
118 National Alliance for the Development of Community Advice Offices (2014).  Towards a Sustainable and Effective Community 
Advice Office Sector in South Africa: A Cost-Benefit and Qualitative Analysis. 
119 NADCAO, pp.102-115.  Ideally, willingness to pay (WTP) estimates should be analysed together with willingness to accept 
(WTA) estimates derived from the same sample of service users to obtain the most balanced results (i.e. because it has been 
widely shown that the WTP generally underestimates the true cost and WTA generally overestimates the true cost).  However, 
the study did not evaluate the WTA responses since the question was not phrased clearly enough and seemed to have led to 
confusion based on responses given. 
120 NADCAO, p.116. 
121 Ibid, p.164. 
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to ensure the sustainability of the sector.122 This provides a cost estimate of USD 3.5 million for a 
national scale up, serving a population of 54 million, at a per capita cost of USD 0.1.123 The study’s 
model estimates vary widely based on assumptions made, but suggest that funding at this levels 
could result in an overall project net value of USD 3.4million to USD 6.4million.124 
Ukraine: Using a Case Multiplier  
 The Open Society Justice Initiative estimated that in 2014, a community law centre cost 
approximately USD 8,000 to USD 12,000 per year to operate and directly provided an average of 
961 services.125  This provides a crude unit estimate of USD 8.3 to USD 12.5 per case handled or 
client seen.  
 A legal needs assessment has been conducted by the International Renaissance Foundation carried 
out an assessment of the accessibility and effectiveness of legal services in Ukraine which found 
that of the 2,500 people surveyed, on average, 54% had encountered at least one legal problems 
in the past three years of which 55% described the problem as “very important”. However, lawyers 
only played a decisive role in resolving 5 per cent of incidents, the majority of other being resolved 
by individuals themselves, some with the assistance of relatives, government institutions, NGOs 
and trade unions and in other cases the problems resolved themselves.126 This would suggest that 
the intervention provided by community law centres in the Ukraine is barely touching the surface 
of basic legal needs in the Ukraine.   
 Assuming a multiplier of 50 to scale up from cases handled to the community served, the per capita 
cost of this programme would be USD 0.2.   
 Using this legal needs approach, the cost of scaling up current provision to a population of 45m 
would be USD 9.4m.   
5.      Justice Hubs 
Kenya: Using a Case Multiplier 
 The annual operating costs of HiiL’s M-Sheria project amount to USD 112,758.127 The project directly 
reaches 20,000 people, providing a unit cost of USD 5.6 per client served.  Assuming that the project 
serves a wider community than the number of people directly reached, i.e. cases handled, a 
                                                          
122 NADCAO, p. 11. 
123 Ibid, p.12. 
124 Ibid, p.12. 
125 Open Society Foundations (2015).  ‘Delivering Community Justice Services at Scale: Community Law Centres in Ukraine’.  Also 
email from Olga Halchenko, Coordinator of Programme Initatives ‘Human Rights and Justice’, International Renaissance Fund, 
dated 19 October 2015.  
126 International Renaissance Foundation (2011): Level of Legal Capacity of the Ukrainian Population: Accessibility and Effectivenss 
of Legal Services.  
127 Email from Aimee Ongeso, Programme Coordinator Kituo Cha Sheria, dated 11th November 2015. 
Developing a portfolio of financially sustainable, scalable, basic legal service models 
Final Report, 18 December 2015 
Page 43 of 92 
 
multiplier of 50 has been applied to estimate the catchment size, providing a unit cost of USD 0.1 
per capita.   
 Using this legal needs approach, the cost of scaling up current provision to a population of 45m is 
USD 5.1m. 
OECD Comparisons  
 In order to develop a comparative picture of unit costs as well as to underpin a benchmarking 
analysis in OECD countries, we next consider three interventions in HICs where there is cost data 
available: legal aid in Queensland, Australia; Community Legal Centers in Ontario, Canada; and 
Citizens Advice Bureau in the UK.  Since each of these interventions is already scaled up to some 
extent to provide national or provincial-wide coverage, for the purposes of this analysis, we assume 
that current provision adequately meets legal needs – although we recognise that in reality this is 
not the case.128 
Australia (Queensland): Cost-Benefit Analysis of Legal Aid 
 By way of comparison with NADCOs South Africa study, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) have 
conducted a cost-benefit analysis of legal aid assistance to the community in Queensland, 
Australia.129  A cost-benefit analysis was undertaken to assess increased efficiency, in terms of the 
avoidance of costs to the justice system, of services which included the provision of duty lawyers, 
dispute resolution services, and legal representation, modelled against a counterfactual that 
assumes a world with no legal aid. The study did not quantify the benefits associated with 
educational services and legal advice services but it did recognise the relevance of educational and 
information services as well as those provided to clients directly: see Figure 2 below. 
                                                          
128 So, for example, the Canadian Bar Association recently analysed gaps in legal service provision in its report (2013), Reaching 
Equal Justice: An Invitation to Envision and Act which has fed into the nine point programme for change of the independent 
national Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Affairs (2013), Access to Civil and Family Justice: A Roadmap 
for Change (2013).  Similar studies have taken place in England and Wales, for example, the Law Society’s Unintended 
Consequences: the cost of the Government’s Legal Aid Reforms (2011) and the Public Law Project’s The Value and Effects of 
Judicial Review (2015). 
129 Pricewaterhouse Coopers. (2009). ‘Economic value of legal aid: analysis in relation to Commonwealth-funded matters with a 
focus on family law’. 
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Figure 2: Catchment size - legal aid services (Queensland, Australia) 
 
 
 The cost-benefit analysis is summarised in Table 2 below and Table 3 then explores several models 
of monetised benefits. The study concludes that there is a strong economic case for appropriately 
and adequately funding legal aid services, based on the magnitude of the quantitative benefits as 
well as the potential qualitative benefits that have not been quantified. 
Table 2: PwC cost benefit analysis of legal aid in Queensland130 
Benefits – avoided costs 
(million USD) 




Benefit – cost ratio 
53.50 23.81 29.69 2.25 
 
Table 3: PwC cost benefit analysis - monetised benefits 
Case 
study 
Potential outcome without 
legal aid 
Avoided cost type Avoided cost 
1 Underlying issues contributing 
to family violence not identified 
and addressed 
Continuation of domestic 
violence over the life of the 
victim 
USD 93,449 
2 Child taken out of 
grandmother’s care 
Child living in out of home care 
from 1 to 18 years 
USD 31,759 to USD 527,921 
3 Family loses home Housing related costs and 




 Assuming the USD 23.8 million funding provided for the legal aid scheme in 2009 adequately served 
the population of the state, this produces a cost of USD 5 per capita.  
                                                          
130 The study made assumptions about case outcomes in order to model avoided costs since data on outcomes of legally aided 
matters commended in the court were not available. Results are presented for the scenario in which 50 % of legal aid matters 
result in mediated agreements and 50% result in final orders. Weight is given to final order outcomes, which is supported by 
findings of Dewar et al (2000) that self-representing litigants are less likely to settle. 
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Canada (Ontario): Community Legal Centre Provision 
 In 2013-2014, Legal Aid Ontario’s 56 community-based legal clinics operated on an annual budget 
of USD 44 million and serve a catchment area with a population of 12.8 million people.131  Assuming 
this funding was sufficient, the cost per capita was approximately USD 3.4, or USD 15.4 per low-
income person in the catchment area. Additionally, data is available on the LAOs duty counsel 
programme, which costs USD 13 per civil case to run.132   
UK: Value for Money of CABs 
 In 2014-15, the Citizens Advice UK network in 600 local Citizen Advice premises and over 2,000 
community centres, doctor’s surgeries, courts, and prisons across England and Wales estimated 
that it helped 2.5 million people, handled 6.2 million issues directly and provided information to 
the 20.7 million people that accessed its web page.133  With an annual budget of USD 361 million,134 
then assuming national and sufficient coverage, this produces cost estimate of USD 6.3 per capita. 
 Looking at benefits, a project evaluation in 2014-15 found that the project helps two in three people 
resolve the problem they came to address and that for every £1 spent:135 
 The government saves £1.51 through reductions in health service demand, local authority 
homelessness services and out of work benefits; 
 £8.74 of wider economic and social benefits are achieved such as improved health, wellbeing, 
participation and productivity; and 
 Direct clients benefit by £10.94 through income gained in benefits, debts written off, and 
consumer problems resolved. 
Findings on the Costs of Scale-Up  
 In the majority of case studies presented in this report, data availability has limited the assessment 
to the monetary costs of basic legal service provision in the form of operating budgets for 
community legal clinics or paralegals to calculate the unit costs of current provision. In some cases 
it was indicated that coverage was sufficient for a given geographic community, allowing a 
straightforward per capita cost estimate for scaled up provision. In other cases data was only 
available on the number of cases handled, which required an extrapolation to estimate the size of 
the community served. At this point in the research the standard assumption was made that the 
coverage is fifty times the number of cases.   
                                                          
131 Legal Aid Ontario (2014). ‘Statement of Operations’.  
132 Ibid.  
133 Citizens Advice. (2015). ‘The value of the Citizens Advice service: Our impact in 2014-15’. 
134 Ibid.  
135 Please note: Details on the benefit-cost analysis are not provided in the evaluation report. The headline figures have been 
added for illustrative purposes, but this is in no way an endorsement of the methodology used or accuracy of the figures. 
Developing a portfolio of financially sustainable, scalable, basic legal service models 
Final Report, 18 December 2015 
Page 46 of 92 
 
 Based on these assumptions, Figure 3 and Appendix 3 show that the range of per capita costs of 
scaling up basic legal service provision for the cases studies in non-OECD countries covered is USD 
0.1 to USD 1.3 per capita.136 In four cases where separate detailed analysis (Myanmar, Sierra Leone, 
Rwanda and South Africa) has been carried out on the costs of nationwide coverage based on 
scaling up current provision the costs are much lower and range from USD 0.1 – 0.3.137  In OECD 
countries, it is between USD 3 and USD 6, likely reflecting the higher cost of wages. 
Figure 3: Unit costs of current programmes (USD per person) 
 
 
 Appendix 4 benchmarks these unit costs against five key indicators: GDP; government revenue and 
spending on judiciary, health and education. This data merits further analysis but three points stand 
out already: 
 Developing countries are already strongly prioritising spending on judiciary. Figure 4 shows 
that in all the developing country case studies spending on judiciary as % of total spent on 
health and education is at least as high as the OECD average of 1%. In contrast, in most 
countries spending is 2-8 times higher than in the OECD and in Rwanda and Liberia the 
spending ratio is 15 times higher.   
                                                          
136 This seeks to provide an overview without endorsing the drawing of like for like comparisons; since the methodologies behind 
the cost and benefits vary widely and the programmes operate in hugely distinct contexts, such comparisons should not be drawn 
haphazardly. 
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Figure 4: Prioritisation – government spending on judiciary as a percentage of spending on education and health 
 
 In three low/lower middle income countries the cost of basic legal services looks very high – 
and potentially unaffordable - relative to government revenues. Figure 5 shows in the OECD 
countries there is a striking similarity in the ratio of basic legal services to revenue – the range 
is just 0.03-0.04%. By contrast the ratio in Sierra Leone is ten times larger, Liberia seventeen 
times and Bangladesh twenty five times. South Africa by contrast seems very affordable - just 
one tenth of the OECD level.   
Figure 5: Affordability – cost of national basic legal services compared to government revenues 
 
 Two of these three countries also appear to be spending a disproportionately high amount 
on basic legal services relative to their spending on judiciary, although note that this includes 
government tax revenues as well as on-budget support from donors. Figure 6 shows that in 










Affordability - cost of national basic legal services 
compared to government revenues 
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50%and Bangladesh over 200%.  Again South Africa appears very affordable – its costs are just 
0.1% of the spend on the judiciary.   
Figure 6: Affordability – cost of national basic legal services compared to government spending on judiciary 
 
 The above analysis suggests a number of avenues for further work: 
 Wider collection and deeper analysis of legal needs surveys to better understand the scale 
and type of demand for basic legal services (including demand on criminal justice system and 
traditional justice systems), what demand is being met by existing legal service provision and 
what is not and why (for example because existing provision is unaffordable for the majority 
of people); 
 Wider collection of a broader range of cost and benefit data (in particular, non-monetary 
costs and  monetary and non-monetary benefits) for use in cost-benefit analyses of basic legal 
service provision; 
 More widespread use of macro-level data to benchmark costs including possible 
development of three affordability benchmarks138 relative to revenue, spending on judiciary 
and spending on health and education, to ensure country programmes are based on 
sustainable level of unit costs and to support bids for donor  funding at an individual country 
level; and 
 Development of an agreed definition of basic and primary justice concepts to enable the 
justice sector to be on the same footing as education and health in global financing discussions, 
                                                          
138 These benchmarks might be expressed in the form of ranges – clearly affordable; affordable; possibly unaffordable; definitely 
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debates on implementation of Global Goals and value for money analysis such as the 
Copenhagen Consensus.139 
Cost Saving and the Use of Technology  
 While the per capita cost of basic legal service in low/lower middle income countries is much lower 
than in OECD countries (typically 5-10% of OECD), the unit costs are a much higher proportion of 
total tax revenues (typically ten times higher). There is therefore an even greater incentive in the 
poorer countries to consider ways in which that cost can be further reduced to make the services 
more affordable and sustainable. Here we consider specifically the prospects of technology having 
real, game-changing potential to bring the costs of service provision down. The value of technology 
is likely to be less in poorer countries. While the costs of computers and mobile phones are the 
same the value of time saved is likely to be much lower as wages are much lower. However the 
introduction of technology enables poorer countries to overcome the otherwise binding constraint 
of a very limited number of trained legal experts. 
Access to Technology 
 At the outset, it is important to recognise that effective use of the technology is more complicated 
than simple physical access;140 skills and motivation to use the technology must be considered as 
well.141  Accordingly, those excluded from the use of technology are likely to be disproportionately 
poorer, less well-educated and older. This has important implications for the use of technology in 
LICs. 
 The Pew Centre has studied the use of mobile technology in 32 emerging or developing countries 
and concluded that countries fall into at least three bands (% of the population with access): 
 Well-connected (over 60%): this includes China and Argentina alongside Chile, Russia, Poland, 
Venezuela and the United States (87%);  
 Moderately connected (40-60%): this includes South Africa and the Ukraine alongside Brazil, 
Egypt, Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam; and 
 Poorly connected (below 40%): this includes Bangladesh (11%), Kenya (29%) and Pakistan (8%) 
alongside Ghana, India and Tanzania. 
 In contrast, a World Bank Review focuses on ‘ICT (information and communications technology) 
readiness’ that is seen as dependent on factors including existing use of technology, capacity in 
                                                          
139 Lomborg, B. (2014). ‘Preliminary benefit-cost assessment of the final OWG outcome’. Copenhagen Consensus Centre.   
140 Smith, R. (2015). ‘Digital Delivery of Legal Services to People on Low Incomes’. Available at 
http://www.thelegaleducationfoundation.org/digital-report last accessed 12 November 2015. 
141 Hesper, E. et al. (2015). ‘From digital skills to tangible outcomes: Improving measures and models of internet use’. Oxford 
Internet Institute, LSE, University of Twente. Available at www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/projects/?id=112 last accessed 12 November 
2015  last accessed 12 November 2015.  
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relation to literacy on the one hand and available bandwidth on the other and financial capability.142  
On this basis, states in Africa are divided into three categories:  
 ICT ready states: South Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia; 
 ICT progressing states: Nigeria, Cameroon, Tanzania, Algeria, Seychelles and Ghana; and 
 ICT potentially progressing states: Botswana, Malawi, Central Africa, Chad, Guinea, Somalia, 
Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Rwanda.143 
 Whichever approach is taken, mobile phone ownership in LICs is far higher than internet access but 
typically in relation to conventional phones rather than smartphones.144  There is, however, high 
usage of text facilities and moderate use of video and photograph functionality, particularly among 
younger age groups.145  Internet usage is further constrained by the fact that the dominant language 
on it is English (26% of users), followed by Chinese (21.5%) and then Spanish and Arabic.  This 
suggests that internet-based provision of basic legal services in LICs is likely to be less useful than 
mobile-phone based access for some time.   
 However, it is important to remember that access to technology is not a static picture.  One 
estimate of credible annual growth of access to the internet specifically is 7.9%146 and this is like to 
be disproportionately outside OECD countries where access is already relatively high and given the 
presence of internet access in Global Goal 9. Access to the internet is therefore likely to improve in 
LICs and probably quite quickly but cannot be counted on yet. 
Use of Technology in HICs 
 Technology can be used in support of basic legal services by assisting: 
 Paralegals or lawyers i.e. providing some form of backup for front line deliverers of service e.g. 
information, management and other services; 
 Members of the public directly; and 
 Members of the public but accessed via a lawyer, paralegal or other intermediary. 
In HICs, for the most part, basic legal services are still delivered in fairly traditional ways.  However, 
things are slowly beginning to change, with innovations in the second and third categories over and 
above the use of technology that has existed in the first category for some time. 
                                                          
142 Benyekhlef, K.et al. (2015). ‘ICT-Driven Strategies for Reforming Access to Justice Mechanisms in Developing Countries’. World 
Bank Legal Review Volume 6.   
143Abdel Wahab, M. et al (2012). ‘Online Dispute Resolution: theory and practice - A Treatise on Technology and Dispute 
Resolution’.  
144 Ibid. 
145 Schmidt, E. & Cohen, J. (2013). ‘The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, Nations and Business’, p. 20. 
146 Internet live stats. Available at http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ last accessed 12 November 2015. 
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 Technology is being used to produce variations in service packages: 
 Divorce Online offers a basic divorce assistance package at £69 and offers three other packages 
with escalating levels of management and advice up to £399.147  
 UK-based Co-operative Legal Services offers a fixed fee basic family law service for £99 + VAT.  
 In New South Wales, Australia, LawAccess NSW offers a package of services based around a core 
website, including a telephone-call centre and a sister website that assists with self-
representation.148 
 Epoch sells document assembly programmes such as Rapidocs which assist with the drafting of 
documents such as wills backed-up by employed lawyers who communicate through skype-style 
phone or video with clients and sign off on the completed package.  
 Hotdocs is a leading US supplier of programmes ‘to generate everything from simple, single-
page letters and NDAs to complex contracts and estate planning documents, all in a fraction of 
the time it would take to do it the old, cut-and-paste way and with much greater accuracy.’149 
 Technology is also being used to produce mobile-phone based services:  
 Australian firm Slater and Gordon and the Cycling Touring Campaign (CTC) have developed a 
smartphone app for recording information relating to a road traffic accident involving a car to 
send to the firm to begin a claim: witness contact details; third party contact and vehicle details; 
weather conditions; photos of the scene; equipment damage; any injuries; and the time, date 
and location via GPS.150  
 Finally, technology is being used to deliver internet-based services: 
 Rechtwijzer 2.0 (translated as ‘signpost to justice’) is an online dispute resolution platform which 
launched in the Netherlands in October 2012. It was developed by the Hague Institute for the 
Internationalisation of Law (HiiL) and is funded by the Dutch Legal Aid Board. The platform uses 
a diagnostic question and answer tree which leads into a selection of unbundled dispute 
resolution services. Flat fees are charged at each new service point beginning with the dialogue 
stage and then for each professional service requested thereafter. 
                                                          
147 Divorce Online. Available at www.divorce-online.co.uk last accessed 12 November 2015.  
148 Smith, R., and Paterson, A., (2013).  ‘Face to Face Legal Services and their Alternatives: Global Lessons from the Digital 
Revolution’. 
149 Hotdocs. Available at http://www.hotdocs.com last accessed 12 November 2015.  
150 National Cycling Charity, (2013, December 19). ‘CTC launch iPhone 'Crash Kit' app’. Available at 
http://www.ctc.org.uk/news/ctc-launch-iphone-crash-kit-app last accessed 12 November 2015.  
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 British Columbia is planning a Civil Resolution Tribunal providing an integrated approach which 
takes the user through from initial information and advice to resolution of a small claims dispute 
(and a form of housing dispute). 
 UK-based sites like roadtrafficrepresentation.com produce automated advice depending on 
information which the user inputs to advise on likely sentence of a road traffic prosecution and 
print out a brief to Counsel. 
 Adviceguide.org.uk (which is provided by the citizens advice movement) and advicenow.org.uk 
(a site provided by advisers outside citizens advice) both offer internet-based advice on basic 
legal problems. In Canada, clicklaw.bc.ca, educaloi.qc.ca and yourlegalrights.on.ca perform 
similar functions. 
Use of Technology of in LICs 
 Innovative uses of technology in LICs display a similar pattern: 
 In India, Law Farm offers a fixed fee for an initial 15 minute telephone consultation for a fixed 
fee of Rs299 (about USD 5) while Law Service India offers an online legal forum, online chat 
facility every afternoon from 2-9pm and a fixed fee email advice service for Rs1200 (about USD 
18). However, none of the state’s legal aid bodies uses much technology beyond 24 hour 
telephone helplines, of which Kerala opened the first in 2006 and the 133,847 ICT-enabled 
village level Common Service Centres around the country to access government, financial, social 
and private sector services do not yet offer legal services. 
 The M-Sheria project in Kenya operated by HiiL and Kituo Cha Sheria from 2012 has experienced 
delays in moving beyond the initial pilot stages owing to the difficulties associated with setting 
up the necessary technology. The last questions posted on the central website date from May 
2015 and the last answers date from 2013. 
 Legal Aid South Africa operates a toll-free legal advice line that serviced 42,866 consultations in 
2013-14, a relatively small but significant percentage of all consultations - around 12%.  The 
Board plans to add a document assembly facility through Hotdocs that will allow users to 
complete of pleadings, documents and forms that can then be signed off by Board.  It is hoped 
that a ‘justice system navigator’ will be added to help users through court processes.151  
In the Ukraine, the CLC network is developing online ‘chat’ with lawyers, as well as an android 
application for smart phones. Skype-consultations are practiced in different centres, often in 
cooperation with local libraries that have computer rooms. However, a study by the 
International Renaissance Foundation suggests that the use of telephone and email 
                                                          
151 Email from Patrick Hundermark, Chief Legal Executive of Legal Aid South Africa to Roger Smith dated 19 October 2015. 
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consultations in CLCs carries risks in terms of the quality of instructions that can be taken while 
web consultations are more valuable for CLCs than for clients.152 
Findings on Technology as a Cost Saving Measure 
 Notwithstanding the developments in HICs, it is premature to see technology as a replacement for 
individualised assistance rather than as a supplement to more traditional forms of delivery.  So, 
Epoch’s Rapidocs is backed up by legal assistance provided through phone and video, Rechtwijzer 
2.0 is backed up by a system of legal counters and sites like Adviceguide.org.uk are part of a national 
network of CABs. Time is needed to see whether private provision using low cost unbundling, 
document assembly and online assistance can adequately substitute for conventional personal legal 
services so at this moment, it would not be safe to cut those traditional services.  
 In most LICs, such low sums are being spent on justice provision that it is difficult to see that 
technology will allow reduction of the budget. This is particularly the case because most countries 
prioritise the provision of legal aid in criminal cases in order to meet their obligations under the 
international human rights obligations where they are generally clearer than for civil cases.153 Going 
forward, the best use of ICT is modular, collaborative, uses technology which is widely available, 
and is adapted to the level of access available in the country concerned. To this end, the potential 
of older forms of technology should not be forgotten: ’radio has so far had the biggest impact in 
development of all technologies but because it is low-tech is often overlooked’.154 The most fruitful 
approach apart from infrastructure support may be that demonstrated in the projects that focus 
on paralegals or advice agencies rather than individual users. 
 Further work to evaluate the use of technology would be valuable. Such work would look in 
particular at whether those on low incomes are able to use the services provided and whether the 
quality of assistance is as good as that provided by traditional means as well as flagging those cases 
that require such assistance.  
                                                          
152 International Renaissance Foundation, Open Society Foundations & UNDP. (2013). ‘Legal aid in Community: manual on 
creation and administration of community law centres’.  
153 e.g. under Article 14 of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights and the various regional equivalents, such as 
Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights.  
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. Available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx 
last accessed 12 November 2015.  
European Convention on Human Rights. Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf last accessed 12 
November 2015.  
154 Young, H. (2015, June 3). ‘2015 challenges: how can technology and innovation be a force for good?’ Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jun/03/2015-challenges-how-can-technology-
and-innovation-be-a-force-for-good last accessed 12 November 2015 
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Chapter 4:      How can scaled up legal services be financed 
sustainably? 
 Basic legal services can be financed sustainably through: governments, donors, philanthropists, the 
private sector, users and hybrid models.155  In what follows, we develop a typology of models in 
each of these categories, drawing on examples from the health and education sectors where 
appropriate, and consider which of these models are likely to be more or less suited to the financing 
of basic legal services.  
Government and Government-Marshalled Financing 
 One clear conclusion from the analysis above is the extent to which low and lower middle income 
countries are already prioritising spending on the judiciary. This would suggest there are resources 
potentially available for countries to fund at least some of the cost of basic legal services. However 
there are two important caveats.156  First the costs of these programmes would need to be clearly 
affordable – in proportion to spend on the judiciary and relative to government revenues. Second 
the political incentives around funding state-provided justice and non-state provided justice e.g. 
paralegals, may be very different. While governments may be able to contribute they may choose 
not to do so. The political economy issues around this decision are considered in detail in Chapter 
5.  
National and Sectoral Strategies 
 Governments can ensure alignment between national development goals and line agencies through 
overall national strategies that are reinforced by budget allocations as incentive and accountability 
mechanisms.157  In some cases (for example Uganda, Rwanda and Sierra Leone) justice sector 
strategies linked to national resource allocation processes ‘nest’ under such national strategies, and 
provide more specificity about government strategies and plans for the justice sector, which in each 
of these three cases include enhancing access to justice at community level. 
Priority Sector Funding  
 In order to encourage certain sectors of the economy to grow, certain LICs have created priority 
sectors into which they channel private finance. The Nigerian and Indian governments, for example, 
have identified priority areas for finance – most commonly, education, agriculture and SMEs – and 
have required financial institutions and other private sector players to allocate a percentage of their 
profits or assets into those sectors. In South Africa the government passed Black Economic 
                                                          
155 OSJI. (2015). ‘Legal Empowerment Charette: Innovative Financing Models for Funding Basic Legal Services’. 
156 Another issue is likely to be the relationship with traditional justice and its funding needs and modalities.  
157 Linn, J. Incentives and Accountability for Scaling Up in Chandy et al. (2013). ‘Getting to Scale: How to Bring Development 
Solutions to Millions of Poor People’, p.147. 
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Empowerment (BEE) legislation in the late 1990s, post-Apartheid, requiring companies to set aside 
a percentage of profits to fund BEE.   
 A pool of funding to fund basic legal service provision could be created in a LIC if the government 
decided that basic legal service provision was a priority area. Governments could impose special 
levies or taxes on the private sector to fund this new priority sector.  So, in Sierra Leone, Namati 
has advocated for a provision, now included in the draft Bioenergy and Food Security Guidelines, 
which requires firms interested in large-scale land acquisitions to contribute to a basket fund which 
will in turn support legal representation via paralegals for land-owning communities.158  However, 
this requires a sufficiently attractive sector to sustain such investment notwithstanding such 
measures as well as generating political will in support of them. 
Cross-Sector Programming  
 Providing basic legal services in the context of other primary service delivery such as education or 
healthcare can provide opportunities to access sector-specific government financing.  So, for 
example, in Mozambique, Namati works with community-based paralegals focused on ensuring the 
effectiveness and accountability of health services.  Government spending on healthcare is USD 1 
billion annually while spending on legal aid is a tiny fraction of that sum.159  Namati estimate that 
0.5% of healthcare spending could pay for health-focused paralegals throughout much of the 
country.160   
Social impact bonds 
 Social impact bonds (SIBs) combine public investment with private finance to enable delivery 
organisations to provide services on a Payment By Results (PBR) basis.  Under a PBR contract, a 
government pays service providers on the achievement of certain pre-agreed results. This means 
that the service provider must cover the upfront costs of delivery, which is often difficult for social 
enterprises and charities that may not have access to sufficient working capital. SIBs offer a means 
of bridging this gap, by enabling socially-minded investors to fund the provision of a specific service 
on the basis that they will receive a return on their investment if the agreements set out in the PBR 
contract are met. Generally speaking, the more successful the programme, the greater the return 
to investors, usually up to a pre-agreed cap. At the centre of these arrangements is usually an 
intermediary organisation, responsible for coordinating between investors, service providers and 
outcome funder, and putting together an agreement that fits all of their needs. 
 The first SIB was launched by Social Finance UK at Peterborough Prison in 2010 with the intention 
of reducing reoffending rates and outcome payments were based on a reduced number of 
reconvictions amongst the cohort group compared to a non-cohort group. It is worth noting the 
measurement challenges which the project faced and the difficulties these raised for sustaining 
                                                          
158 Namati (draft).  ‘Building a Movement of Grassroots Legal Advocates: Strategic Plan 2016-2018’. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
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private finance: the introduction of probationary services for all offenders left the programme 
without an “unserved” population or control group to measure results and therefore success 
against. Nevertheless, an increasing number of SIBs have been introduced in the UK, US and other 
developed contexts during the past five years as means of facilitating social investment, primarily 
in the fields of criminal justice and social care but also in health and education (see Box 1). 
Box 1: The Punjab Education Foundation (PEF)161 
PEF is an autonomous statutory body established in 1991 which receives money from the Punjab 
Government, the World Bank and DFID for its education programmes. The Fund currently assists 
more than 1,300 schools, reaching around 600,000 students. 
Through its Foundation Assisted Schools programme, primary and secondary schools are given per 
student subsidies on the condition that they offer free education to all students and achieve a 
minimum student pass rate of 67% on the Quality Assurance Tests (QAT). Bonuses are awarded to 
the teachers and schools with the highest pass rates.162 
The Pakistani government is both willing to invest in improving the quality of service delivery in the 
education sector and able to engage effectively with private sector partners. It has also developed 
clear methods for measuring educational outcomes. PEF therefore represents a prime developing 
country opportunity for SIB investment.  
 The suitability of SIB funding for basic legal service provision rests on such services generating a 
proven social benefit, that benefit being susceptible to clear and quantitative measurement and 
the ability of government to ultimately pay providers for that benefit.  This is perhaps more likely 
to be the case with basic legal problems that address subsistence needs and less likely with those 
that assist with problems relating to goods and services. An alternative that might be more suitable 
to  problems relating to goods and services might be cash transfers, which have been used in the 
context of school attendance and vaccination, for example through the Brazilian Bolsa Familia 
programme, and might potentially be used in conjunction with birth registration as the focus here 
is more on outputs than outcomes. 
Donor financing  
 As noted earlier, donors have funded justice relatively sparsely in comparison with education and 
health. As Figure 7 shows, there has been an increase in spending on justice and its share has 
increased three fold in the last nine years from 0.7% in 2005 to 2.0% in 2013.163  However, as Figure 
8 shows, this increase has been focused in a handful of countries – Afghanistan, Mexico and West 
Bank/Gaza. Moreover, as Figure 9 shows, the increase has overwhelmingly been funded by the US 
whose spending has increased six fold over this period and who now accounts for 59% of all aid to 
                                                          
161 http://www.pef.edu.pk/ 
162 A World Bank impact assessment found the PEF to be one of the cheapest programmes for increasing enrolment in the 
developing world. Through its Education Voucher Scheme, children aged 4 - 17 from poorest families receive free education in 
the nearest (PEF EVS) private schools of their own choice. PEF-supported schools have seen significant increases in the number 
of students and schooling inputs, improved gender ratios and low dropout rates. 
163 LDP analysis of OECD DAC CRS database, ibid 
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the justice sector. The EU is the next largest donor but its share of the total has fallen from 21% to 
15%. Japan has rapidly grown its programme from almost zero in 2005 and is now the third largest 
donor, providing 7% of the total. While the UK and UNDP are traditionally linked to justice sector 
each only accounts for 1% of total aid. Australia, Germany and Netherlands all provide more aid.164 
The current low levels of aid are both a challenge and an opportunity to press for additional funding 
e.g. linked to the new Global Goal 16 on justice. DFID has recently launched a new Policy Approach 
to the Rule of Law and is currently reviewing all its programmes. It is worth considering how this 
mood of the moment might be capitalised on, while recognising that such funding streams are 
dependent on international and domestic politics and policy trends in aid and security. 
Figure 7: Justice share (%) of all aid 
 
                                                          
164 Aid figures do not include support from non-concessional sources such as the World Bank’s International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). It has provided significant loans between 2005-2009 and in terms of combined aid and 
non-concessional finance was the fourth largest provider. But funding was fallen sharply since 2010. The Asian Development is 
another source of non-concessional finance but between 2005-2013 only made one large commitment (to the Philippines).  
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Figure 8: Justice Aid recipients – percentage share, 2005-2013 
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offered a focal point for plans and resources needed to achieve targets.  Examples include the 
Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Global Partnership for Education, the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Global Agriculture and Food Security 
Program of which the latter has probably been the most successful.165  A variation on this theme 
was the UK’s 2003 proposal for an International Finance Facility to provide significant additional 
funds for immediate development assistance which was also was inspired by the MDGs.166 
Box 2: International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) 
IFFIm167 was set up in 2006 to rapidly accelerate the availability and predictability of funds for the 
programme run by the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (Gavi). Gavi was itself 
established by Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation as a public private partnership. IFFIm uses long-
term pledges from donor governments to sell 'vaccine bonds' in the capital markets, making large 
volumes of funds immediately available for Gavi programmes. Vaccine bonds have been issued in 
various markets – from London in 2006 to Tokyo in 2010 – and proved popular with institutional 
and individual investors who are drawn to the security of a government-backed return and an 
ethical investment opportunity.  
IFFIm was the first aid-financing entity in history to attract legally-binding commitments of up to 20 
years from donors and offers the ‘predictability"’ that developing countries need to make long-term 
budget and planning decisions about immunisation programmes.  IFFIm has nearly doubled Gavi’s 
funding for immunisation programmes, benefiting from USD 6.5 billion in donor contributions over 
23 years from the governments of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Norway, Australia, Spain, The 
Netherlands, Sweden and South Africa. With the World Bank as its treasury manager, IFFIm has 
raised more than USD 5 billion to date - three times the donor funds received into the IFFIm account 
over the same period, demonstrating the power of frontloading the availability of the committed 
funds. 
Challenge Funds 
 Challenge funds are a species of competitive grant often used to finance innovative ideas in a way 
that reduces their risks. They were used widely by DFID in the 2000s to promote innovative business 
activities in developing countries, assisting them in overcoming the initial hurdles of starting up 
rather than taking their products to scale. However, there is no obvious reason why they couldn’t 
also be used to take basic legal services to scale. 
Payment by Results 
 Where donor financing is chosen, thought should be given to innovative aid instruments that 
incentivise governments to invest in scaling up. An example of this is PBR. DFID-Uganda is currently 
trialling such an approach in the health sector, examining the relative effects of financing one set 
of health clinics through a PBR approach versus another set of clinics financed on the basis of 
                                                          
165 Garner, D. and Kharas, H. ‘Scaling Up Impact: Vertical Funds and Innovative Governance’ in Chandy et al. (2013). ‘Getting to 
Scale: How to Bring Development Solutions to Millions of Poor People’. 
166 IFFIm. ‘Origins of IFFIm’. Available at http://www.iffim.org/about/origins-of-iffim/  last accessed 12 November 2015 
167 IFFIm. Available at http://www.iffim.org/ last accessed 12 November 2015  
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payment for inputs. The key challenges of PBR in the health sector would also be faced in the 
context of basic legal service provision. These include:  
 The need to reveal the incentive structure for behavioural changes among service providers; 
 Specifying results so they align with the incentives being sought; 
 Ensuring specified results are not easily manipulated or ‘gamed’, through suppliers manipulating 
either indicators and targets or data so as to minimise payment risk; 
 Ensuring capacity exists to undertake the data collection and data management required to 
monitor the results; and  
 Ensuring specified results can be independently verified. 
Philanthropy 
Grant-making 
 A number of philanthropic organisations engage in grant-making activities to fund initiatives in LICs 
in areas that overlap with the provision of basic legal services but few actually fund the provision 
of those services as Table 4 shows.  
Table 4: Sources of philanthropic grant funding 
Organisation Activities in legal service provision Funding 
Ford Foundation168 Supports broad range of development initiatives 
(democratic governance, economic reform, education, 
gender). Grantees include, in China, Beijing Normal 
University, PILnet and the Beijing Child Legal Aid and 
Research Centre, and, in the US, the Juvenile Law Center of 
Philadelphia and the Partnership for Safety and Justice. 
Grants for the Foundation’s 
work on reforming civil and 
criminal justice totalled £8m 
in 2014 and ranged from 
USD 70,000 to USD 1.05m. 
Joffe Charitable 
Trust169 
Funds development projects in Anglophone Africa, usually 
on human rights, corruption and economic reform. In 2014 
no grants were made to legal service providers. 
In 2013/14 the Trust 




Broad range of interests (human rights, conservation, city 
planning, technology). MacArthur supports juvenile justice 
reform in 40 US states, primarily through its Models for 
Change Initiative, which aims to accelerate a national 
juvenile justice reform movement to improve the lives of 
young people in trouble with the law. This programme will 
close in 2017 after 20 years. The initiative has supported 
states’ efforts to bring about changes to law, policy and 
practice, and sought to provide models for juvenile justice 
reform. 
In 2014 the Foundation 
disbursed USD 231.4m in 
grants. Grant-making not 
disaggregated in publicly 
available data. 
                                                          
168Ford Foundation. Available at http://www.fordfoundation.org/ last accessed 12 November 2015  
169 Joffe Charitable Trust. Available at http://joffecharitabletrust.org/ last accessed 12 November 2015 
170MacArthur Foundation. Available at  https://www.macfound.org/  last accessed 12 November 2015 
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Oak Foundation171 The Foundation’s international human rights programme: 
preserves public memory of human rights violations; works 
to prevent arbitrary detention and torture; protects and 
strengthens the capacity of human rights; and supports 
advocacy work, with a focus on amplifying voices from the 
Global South.  
In 2014 the Foundation 
disbursed grants totalling 
USD 22.18m under its 




Uses law to protect and empower people around the world. 
Seek to secure legal remedies for HR abuses and promote 
effective enforcement of the rule of law through litigation, 
advocacy, research and technical assistance. Focus on 
protecting minority rights and developing effective and 
accountable justice systems (support and train lawyers and 




Nine programmes altogether, of which: one deals with 
advocacy, research and litigation -- funding grantees (e.g. 
HRW, Liberty, PILnet) who research and document human 
rights abuses, campaign for human rights, and bring test 
cases in order to strengthen the global human rights 
infrastructure. A second focuses on women’s rights, 
including grassroots campaign groups, but also legal 
advisory services (Federation of Women Lawyers – Kenya, 
Women’s Legal Aid Centre Tanzania, Women’s Legal Centre 
South Africa, Women’s Resource Centre Armenia); and a 
third on LGBTI rights, again primarily advocacy and 
campaign-based but also some provision for legal services 
(LGBT Support Centre Of The Macedonian Helsinki 
Committee, Transgender Legal Defence Project) 
Founded in 1995, since 
when the Foundation has 
awarded grants totalling 
£230m. In 2014 the Trust 
disbursed: approx. £4m to 
grantees working in 
advocacy, research and 
litigation; £3.3m on 
women’s rights; and £0.8m 
on LGBTI rights. No financial 
data available on legal 
services specifically. 
The David & Elaine 
Potter 
Foundation174 
Supports three main areas of education, civil society and 
research. Legal assistance sits under the second of these. 
The only relevant grantee identified is Reprieve, which 
provides legal support to prisoners who would otherwise be 
denied access to justice (incl. death penalty cases, 
Guantanamo prisoners). 
Founded in 1999, since 
when the Foundation has 
awarded grants totalling 
over £15m. Reprieve was 
awarded £60,000 in 2014. 
 
 This demonstrates the risks of philanthropic funding as while not dependent on political cycles and 
policy fashion in the same way as donor financing, it is only sustainable for as long as the 
philanthropist or philanthropic body continues to prioritise provision.  Certain areas of basic legal 
service provision, for example, women’s rights, may stand a better chance of continued funding 
than others, in part because they share characteristics with health and education such as focusing 
attention on the human condition, inviting empathy and triggering a sense of urgency. Certain 
constituencies of philanthropists may also offer better prospects of continued funding than others, 
for example, local philanthropists who have a long-standing connection to the constituency of 
beneficiaries or who stand to benefit from improvements to the locality. 
                                                          
171 Oak Foundation. Available at http://www.oakfnd.org/ last accessed 12 November 2015 
172 Open Society Foundations. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/programs/open-society-justice-initiative last 
accessed 12 November 2015 
173 Sigrid Rausing Trust. Available at https://www.sigrid-rausing-trust.org/ last accessed 12 November 2015 
174 Potter Foundation. Available at http://www.potterfoundation.com/ last accessed 12 November 2015 
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Pro Bono 
 Pro bono legal assistance is a response by the legal profession in a country to provide free or low 
cost legal services to individuals that would otherwise not be able to afford legal advice. Various 
initiatives have sought to encourage the use of pro bono legal work provided by local and/or or 
internationally-based lawyers.  
 Local pro bono service provision may be coordinated by professional associations and/or legal aid 
associations such as South Africa’s Association of University Legal Aid Institutions Trust (AULAI), a 
voluntary association of all South African university law clinics offering legal advice and education 
provided by volunteer law students.175  Funding for the operating costs of coordinating the clinics is 
provided by outside donors, including the Ford Foundation and Attorneys Fidelity Fund, with, for 
example, the latter providing funding to enable clinics to employ a legal professional to oversee 
activity.176 This demonstrates that delivering services at scale is unlikely to be viable on an entirely 
pro bono basis as attendant administration and support costs – let alone a consistent stream 
professionals offering time pro bono - may not be reliably available on a pro bono basis.  However, 
there may be a role for donor financing of these operational costs in conjunction with pro bono 
services (see Box 3). 
Box 3: Rule of Law Expertise Programme (ROLE UK) 
ROLE UK177 is a DFID-funded initiative, established in 2013, which aims to improve rule of law 
environments in DFID priority countries by facilitating access to specialist UK expertise and funding 
the operating costs of doing so. Experts from across HMG, as well as the legal and judicial sectors 
(judges, magistrates, solicitors, barristers, legislative draftsmen) will provide specialist advice, 
mentoring, training and other assistance to improve the policies, organisations and practices of 
legal and judicial systems. 
The programme depends upon the contributions of deployed experts who provide their services on 
a pro bono basis (with government departments reimbursed to backfill positions as needed). The 
programme is managed by an independent unit established by DFID, and staffed by three salaried 
development practitioners and a DFID secondee, all funded by DFID. 
 As for the supply of pro bono legal services themselves, domestically these are likely to be most 
viable when lawyers in LICs and MICs are able to cross-subsidise those services with other more 
lucrative work streams.  Internationally, and most commonly in HICs where salaries are higher and 
subsidy may be more readily available, lawyers are most likely to engage in pro bono provision in 
support of causes perceived to be most worthwhile or interesting to the providers.  So, 
organisations such as Equality Now’s Adolescent Girls’ Legal Defense Fund178 and the Human Dignity 
                                                          
175 Atlantic Philanthropies. Available at http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/grantee/association-university-legal-aid-
institutions-trust last accessed 12 November 2015 
176 So too, the sizeable UK-based Advocates for International Development (A4ID) who provide a brokerage service connecting 
development organisations with legal experts and the International Senior Lawyers Project which provides experienced lawyers 
to promote human rights and equitable, sustainable development both have on-going operational costs.   
177 ROLE UK. Available at http://www.roleuk.org.uk/ last accessed 12 November 2015  
178  Equality Now. Available at http://www.equalitynow.org/AGLDF  last accessed 12 November 2015. 
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Trust179 seek to engage international pro bono lawyers to redress violations suffered by girls and 
homosexuals across the developing world through strategic public interest litigation. The 
irregularity of demand for such skills (being limited to individual test cases) is a good match with 
the irregularity of supply given the constraints on lawyers’ time.    
Endowment/Guarantee models 
 Endowment funds – such as major private universities in the USA and UK, and large foundations 
such as the Wellcome Trust – can be created for investment purposes to generate income from the 
capital invested to fund activities that address social needs. The providers of finance for such 
entities usually create them for philanthropic reasons, but do so in such a way as to enable grant 
making to be carried out in perpetuity.  An endowment fund is sustainable as long as it maintains 
its income generating assets. 
 Similarly, individuals, family offices and endowment funds can use their financial resources to back 
guarantees to other entities who can use them to raise finance to fund activities. If the guarantee 
is called then the funding is in place to honour that call. An example of such a model is Social 
Capital,180 a USA based provider of finance to SMEs in emerging markets, which finances its 
activities, in the first instance, by obtaining guarantees from foundations and family offices. On the 
back of such guarantees it raises commercial lines of credit to on-lend to SMEs. Assuming that the 
underlying loans perform well, lines of credit are serviced and capital repaid, operating costs are 
covered and the guarantee providers receive both a financial and social return on their risk. 
 Both endowment and guarantee models could be used to finance basic legal service provision.  The 
former option depends on having sufficient capital and a hospital financial market to generate the 
necessary income from investment but is likely to be more widely available than the latter option 
which requires the user of the basic legal services to be able to pay for that service so that the entity 
can service the loan obtained by virtue of the guarantee (see paragraphs 4.33-4.34 below). 
Development Impact Bonds181 
 Recent Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) are a variation on SIBS (above) that bring together private 
investors, non-profit and private sector service delivery organisations, governments and donors to 
deliver social outcomes. As with SIBs, private investors provide upfront funding for development 
programmes and earn a return if evaluation demonstrates that the programme in question has 
achieved a set of pre-agreed outcomes. This generates incentives for investors to put in place the 
necessary feedback loops, data collection and performance management systems required to 
achieve desired outcomes, facilitating a more effective, approach to service delivery.  In the case of 
DIBs, however, investors are remunerated by an external funder (e.g. a donor or charitable 
                                                          
179 Human Dignity Trust. Available at http://www.humandignitytrust.org  last accessed 12 November 2015. 
180 Social Capital. Available at http://socialcapital.com/ last accessed 12 November 2015. 
181 Center for Global Development. (2013). ‘Investing in Social Outcomes: Development Impact Bonds’. Available at 
http://international.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/investing-in-social-outcomes-development-impact-bonds.pdf last accessed 12 
November 2015.  
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foundation) rather than by host-country governments. Given the revenue constraints faced by 
many LIC governments, DIBs can overcome a core obstacle to sourcing financing for service 
provision. 
 The first DIB was launched by the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation in June 2015 (see Box 4). 
Presently, DFID and the Inter-American Development Bank are exploring the possibility of using 
DIBS to tackle sleeping sickness in Uganda and in Latin America respectively. 
Box 4: Educate Girls, Rajasthan 
In June 2015 the UBS Optimus Foundation, Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (“CIFF”), 
Educate Girls and Instiglio launched the world’s first Development Impact Bond (DIB) to i) improve 
educational outcomes in Rajasthan, India and ii) to create a “proof of concept”, showing potential 
donors and investors how DIBs can contribute to societal gains and offer financial returns.182 
The DIB is a three-year pilot aimed at addressing the challenges of high dropout rates and poor 
education quality in Rajasthan. An upfront investment, USD 267,000 was raised by UBS Optimus 
Foundation from UBS clients who want to make investments that have a social impact. This sum 
has been invested in Educate Girls, an NGO that works in public schools to implement a range 
of programmes designed to retain students and improve learning outcomes. Under the DIB, 
Educate Girls aims to improve education for 18,000 children – 9000 of them girls – in 166 schools.  
If Educate Girls is successful in improving outcomes, CIFF, the outcome payer, will pay investors 
back with returns set at a maximum of 15% for three years depending on the rate of success. A 
single payment will be made to the UBS Optimus Foundation in accordance with gains made in 
enrolment (measured by the percentage of out of school girls who are enrolled on school rosters) 
and learning (progress in literacy in Hindi, English and numeracy, with causal impact measured 
through the difference in learning gains for students in grades 3-5 between the treatment group 
and a control group) after the programmes conclusion in 2018. UBS will share a portion of this 
outcome payment with Educate Girls, providing Educate Girls with a financial incentive to achieve 
planned outcomes. 
 The suitability of the DIB financing model for basic legal service provision rests on such services 
generating a proven social benefit, that benefit being identifiable in the form of clear and 
measurable results and the ability of an individual donor to ultimately pay providers for those 
results.  As with SIBs, services addressing subsistence needs are more likely to demonstrate those 
features than services relating to goods and services.  
Commercial and Semi-commercial models 
 Commercial models are viable financing solutions where there is a commercial logic to investment. 
This is likely to depend on whether the provision of basic legal services can be monetised or where 
there is some other financial incentive for investment. So, land issues may lend themselves more 
readily to commercial financing than family problems. 
                                                          
182 Instiglio. (2015). ‘Educate Girls Development Impact Bond – Improving education for 18,000 children in Rajasthan’.  
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Impact Investing 
 Impact investing is the term used to describe provision of finance to generate financial and social 
returns. It typically is carried out by entrepreneurial wealth creators, directly or through 
foundations or funds, where these investors draw on their commercial backgrounds and invest in 
enterprises to achieve this double or even triple bottom lone return (people, profit and 
environment).   
 Although still a relatively new practice (the term “impact investing” was coined by the Rockefeller 
Foundation in 2007),183 impact investing has attracted private funds into areas such as education 
and health and may have some relevance for basic legal services. Examples include Omega Schools 
in Ghana, Bridge Academies and the Aureos Health Fund which invests capital from Bill Gates and 
others with USD 70m private equity in affordable health provision in Asia and Africa.184  
 The viability of impact investment to finance basic legal service provision ultimately depends on 
end users who are willing to pay for those services.  While the experience in the education sector 
in particular suggests that there is a large market for low-income families who are willing to pay a 
modest sum for private education given the financial benefits it can bring, it is less clear that there 
is such a market for paying for general basic legal service provision.  Specific elements of such 
provision, such as solving land disputes, may offer more potential as they offer the possibility of 
title which can then be used to obtain credit. 
User Funding 
 The challenge with user funding is to make user fees made affordable for those at the bottom of 
the pyramid.  A number of models offer potential, including: 
 A combination of unbundling basic legal service provision and fixing fees for service bundles is 
being explored by organisations like Cooperative Legal Services and Divorce Online in the UK.  
Similarly, Hotdocs and Rapidocs seek to drive down the cost of service packages through the use 
of standardised templates. 
 Legal insurance is prevalent in the Netherlands and is taking off in Namibia.  Trustco185 is an IFC 
investee diversified financial services company which provides insurance, banking and finance 
services.  Amongst these services is free life and funeral cover to subscribers of partner mobile 
operators, to which it has recently added a short-term legal insurance policy an affordable 
premium that covers individuals and families on legal fees relating to criminal, civil, labour, 
                                                          
183  Rockerfeller Foundation. ‘Impact Investing and Innovative Finance’. Available at https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/our-
work/topics/impact-investing-and-innovative-finance/ last accessed 12 November 2015.  
184 Financial Times. (2011, December 11). ‘Aureos health fund highlights Africa focus’. Available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f4683bd0-2296-11e1-8404-00144feabdc0.html last accessed 12 November 2015; Norfund. ‘Africa 
Health Fund’. Available at http://www.norfund.no/eastern-africa/africa-health-fund-article307-319.html last accessed 12 
November 2015.  
185 Trustco. ‘Vision’. Available at http://www.tgh.na/ last accessed 12 November 2015.  
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matrimonial and administrative issues. The partnership expands Trustco’s customer base, 
allowing it to spread risk more widely. 
 Both of these options have their limitations. For example, unbundling carries the risk that services 
provided will suffer from a reduction in quality by the adviser not having a complete picture of the 
legal problem. The provision of affordable legal insurance depends on the existence of a sufficiently 
mature financial services market, as well as the ability of the service being delivered to provide a 
return – for example, through the payment of damages – and so is likely to be a viable option for 
relatively few unbundled legal services. 
Hybrid models  
 Hybrids typically involve collaboration between different entities such as donors, LIC governments, 
private sector investors and NGOs and LIC government or donors.  Their prevalence reflects the fact 
that a case-by-case, country by country approach is typically needed to create a solution and 
funding model that can work.  
Hybrid Investment Funds 
 M-Pesa is an example of a project financed by a DFID challenge fund that matched an initial 
investment from Vodafone of £1 million.186 It is a mobile phone-based money transfer and 
microfinancing service launched in 2007 by Vodafone for Safaricom and Vodacom, the largest 
mobile network operators in Kenya and Tanzania. It works by allowing users to deposit money into 
an account stored on their cell phones, to send balances using PIN-secured SMS text messages to 
other users, including sellers of goods and services, and to redeem deposits for regular money. 
Users are charged a small fee for sending and withdrawing money which depend on the amount of 
money being transferred and whether the payee is a registered user of the service.  The DFID 
challenge fund helped the private sector to overcome the initial risk of projects via its provision of 
cost-sharing grants. Vodafone obtained a return in the form of service fees from main partner 
Safaricom, who in turn obtained both revenue under a revenue-sharing agreement with Vodafone 
and increased customer loyalty.  By 2010 M-Pesa had become the most successful mobile phone 
based financial service in the developing world and has since expanded to South Africa, Afghanistan, 
India, Romania and Albania. 
 Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP) Pakistan is an example of an endowment model being 
used in combination with grant-making.187  SRSP works in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and parts of FATA 
to advance community empowerment and economic and livelihood development. Its access to 
justice programming focuses on legal empowerment primarily via legal aid clinics, grassroots legal 
services delivered by paralegals, awareness-raising sessions, strengthening state-society relations, 
jirga (traditional leadership assembly) formation and alternative dispute resolution.  SRSP is 
                                                          
186 Vodafone. Available at http://www.vodafone.com/content/index/about/about-us/money_transfer.html last accessed 12 
November 2015.  
187 SRSP. Available at http://www.srsp.org.pk/srsp-main/ last accessed 12 November 2015.  
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financed by grants and donations including a USD 5 million endowment from the Pakistani 
government together with 10% interest from banks, all of which is exempt from income tax (SRSP 
is classed as a “charitable non-profit making institution” for tax purposes).188 
 The Medical Credit Fund is an example of a guarantee model being used in the healthcare context 
using a combination of public and private capital (see Box 5). 
Box 5: The Medical Credit Fund 
The Medical Credit Fund (MCF)189, created in 2011, is a hybrid investment fund, attracting public 
and private grants and capital. Private investors and grant makers include private donor 
organisations, social impact investment funds, private individuals and corporations. Public investors 
and grant makers are mostly development banks and governmental donor agencies. 
The MCF’s primary objective is to increase the delivery of affordable quality healthcare services by 
reducing investment risk. To achieve this objective, it provides performance-based financing – 3500 
loans over seven years to around 2500 primary health care providers – in combination with 
technical support. Grants are used to finance technical assistance programme and capital to finance 
loans and guarantees, as well as to maintain modest default and currency risk facilities. In addition, 
the selected health facilities participate in a medical and business quality improvement programme 
to strengthen their business case and debt servicing capacity, and reduce credit and medical risk. 
The hybrid status of the MCF makes it a public-private partnership. In the MCF approach public and 
private donors can contribute to finance healthcare assets (including working capital and skills) for 
the lower-end of the healthcare market by mitigating credit risks for investors and supporting the 
program costs. As a result the risk of financing these assets is reduced, which subsequently will 
trigger and leverage both international and local private investments. This way the total amount of 
capital is multiplied and the lower-end of the market becomes financeable and scalable enabling 
more consumers to pay for quality health care outcomes. 
Subsidy and Cross-Subsidy 
 Where there is a market that can sustain some user funding but not sufficient to cover the cost of 
basic legal service provision, there is the possibility of a partial subsidy.  The Provision of Equitable 
Affordable Schools (PEAS) is a UK based charity that operates low fee private secondary schools in 
Uganda.190 The Government pays an amount per pupil to the school representing a third of the full 
fee, with the balance borne by the parents. Enrolment and attainment is measured to provide 
comfort that quality of provision is sufficient to justify the state funding provided. This type of PPP 
allows PEAS to run the schools autonomously, whilst being held accountable for enrolment and 
outcomes. 
 Similarly, where providers of basic legal services are of sufficient size and operate portfolios of a 
diverse range of services, there are possibilities for cross-subsidising the delivery of the less 
profitable ones with the more profitable ones. So, BRAC’s HRLS programme cross-subsidises its 
                                                          
188 OSJI (2015).  ‘Legal Empowerment Charette: Innovative Financing Models for Funding Basic Legal Services’. 
189 Medical Credit Fund. Available at http://www.medicalcreditfund.org/ last accessed 12 November 2015.  
190 PEAS. ‘Our values’. Available at http://www.peas.org.uk/about-us/our-values last accessed 12 November  
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social development and legal services programmes with income generated by its microfinance and 
social enterprises (dairy and poultry framing, fisheries, arts and crafts); a small proportion of HRLS 
is also financed through a USD 0.13 client fee, aiming to ensure buy-in and help fund volunteer 
‘barefoot lawyers’.191  Similarly, Microjustice4All charges a fee for its documentation services192 
while Microjusticia Argentina cross-subsidises its services to individuals through service provision 
to fee-paying corporations.193 
Findings on Sustainable Financing Options for Basic Legal Services 
 It is clear from the above analysis that there is a wide range of financing options available in general 
terms. However, the characteristics of interventions that lend themselves to private sector funding 
are likely to be very different to those that are suitable for philanthropic funding.  There are a 
number of considerations which are relevant to identifying a suitable financing option for basic legal 
services specifically, including:  
 Is there a measurable financial outcome?  This may include considering short-term gains in the 
form of consumers willing to pay a small amount for a service as well as longer-term gains such 
as investors benefiting from consumers receiving payouts or being able to realise asset value. 
 Can the revenue from recipients of basic legal service cover costs or is there need for some 
subsidy, pro bono service, foundation grant etc.? 
 Is there a measureable social outcome? This may include considering the extent to which a 
particular model is likely to assist particular sections of society as well as to reduce the incidence 
of particular types of legal problem. 
 Is there an LIC national/civil interest in ensuring certain basic legal services are provided and 
can the government fund the provision? 
 Central to the existence of a financial outcome is the monetisability of basic legal service provision. 
Certain types of basic legal service provision may be more readily monetisable than others, for 
example:  
 Debt issues may be more likely to produce a monetary outcome that can deliver a financial 
return.  
 Child custody disputes may be less likely to produce a monetary outcome that can deliver a 
financial return. 
                                                          
191 See Annex F: Microfinancing Justice Case Study; Legal Aid Clinics in Bangladesh. 
192 See Annex F: Microfinancing Justice Case Study; Microjustice4All. 
193 See Annex F: Microfinancing Justice Case Study; Microjusticia Argentina. 
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 Similarly, the outcomes of certain types of basic legal service provision, whether financial or social, 
may be more easily measured than others:  
 Urban land titling or business registration may be more suitable for quantitative measurement 
e.g. the value of loans secured against titled land or credit a business is able to access.  
 In cases relating to gender-based violence quantitative measurement is less likely to be feasible 
or appropriate (see, for example, Table 4).  
 Unbundling basic legal service provision may therefore be key to both monetising and measuring 
basic legal services to unlock non-government marshalled financing options.  Appendix 5 seeks to 
unbundle types of legal problem addressed by basic legal services and to map them against their 
suitability for different sources of finance.  The legal problems covered broadly map onto property 
law, family law, contract and commercial law.  The monetisability of land, debt and business issues 
lends them to impact investment while the measurability of documentation issues performs a 
similar function.  
 The exercise of unbundling basic legal service provision also assists in the identification of 
commonalities between legal problems which are suitable for particular financing options and 
those which are less so.  For example, the analysis suggests that those legal problems most likely to 
attract grants may be those that appeal to empathy for vulnerable groups such as women and 
children and on emotive issues such as subsistence needs.  The education and health sectors 
demonstrate the power of simplicity of messaging when seeking to raise finance, suggesting that 
basic legal services will stand a better chance of doing so if they are able to unbundle services and 
simplify their product and story.   
 Overall, the analysis suggests that hybrid models are most likely to cater for the broadest range of 
legal problems.  Since it is also likely to be the case that the more diverse the funding base for any 
type of service provision, the more sustainable it will be, innovation and collaboration between 
donors, governments, private sector players and NGOs all the more important in this context.    
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Chapter 5:      What are the political conditions that enable justice 
models to be taken to scale? 
The Relevance of Political Economy Analysis 
 Basic legal services models operate within countries’ policy and regulatory frameworks. These can 
range from hostile (for example government policy to restrict access to legal services such as judicial 
review) - to enabling (for example removing qualified lawyers’ monopoly on the supply of legal 
advice and assistance).  Indeed, in HICs, legal service delivery is increasingly seen as a commodity, 
with non-traditional providers (even supermarkets) providing increasingly unbundled legal services. 
But taking legal service models to scale in this way, requires an appropriate policy, legal and 
regulatory framework – both to enable it to happen (for example removing restrictive practices) 
and to regulate it appropriately.   
 Underpinning the policy and regulatory context for scaling up basic legal services models is the 
political economy - the interests and incentives of groups in society, especially the elite, and how 
these generate particular policy outcomes that may support or undermine development.  This 
includes the role that both formal institutions and informal structures - such as social, political and 
cultural norms; political ideologies; values and ideas; religion and cultural beliefs - play in shaping 
political and economic competition, political behaviour and public policy.194   If basic legal service 
provision is going to be taken to scale, success will depend on a range of issues some of which may 
be operating outside the sector all together. 
 The underlying political conditions are particularly important in fragile and conflict-affected states, 
where basic service delivery has ceased, and the state needs to quickly build trust by reasserting its 
role and its value to its citizens. One method that states have to prove their legitimacy is through 
providing services, and in conflict-affected states, justice and security services are paramount.  
While the state does not necessarily have to provide these services itself in the short- or long- term, 
it does need to ensure that they are being provided, and equitably.   
 New thinking on institutional reform and service delivery195 has thrown light on some of the reasons 
why change in the justice sector has proved so difficult to achieve – including the tendency to focus 
on technocratic, ‘best practice’ approaches.  Preferred approaches to institutional reform are now 
politically smart, and problem (rather than institution) driven.196 Indeed recent thinking has 
                                                          
194 DFID, (2009). ‘Political economy analysis How –To Note’. DFID practice paper. 
195 Andrews, M. (2013). ‘The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions’; Booth, D. and 
Unsworth, S. (2014). ‘Politically smart, locally led development’. ODI. 
Denney, L. and Kirwen, E. (2014). ‘Politically Smart and Locally Led Justice Programming: Learning from Other Sectors’. World 
Bank Just Development, issue 7. 
196 See for example:  North D., et al (2007). ‘Limited Access Orders in the Developing World: A New Approach to the Problem of 
Development’; Kelsall T. (2013). ‘Business Politics, and the State in Africa’; Khan, M. (2002). ‘State Failure in Developing Countries 
and Strategies of Institutional Reform’; Acemoglu, D & Robinson, JA. (2012). ‘Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity 
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highlighted the inherently political nature of access to justice and legal empowerment issues, and 
its indivisibility from the wider political context that shapes the viability and impact of legal service 
provision.197  We seek to apply this thinking to creating a checklist of political economy issues to 
consider when scaling up basic legal service provision. 
Political economy issues to consider in scaling up basic legal service provision: a 
checklist  
 In researching the case studies discussed in this report, we have identified common themes – 
political economy issues that have had an impact time and time again.  We have taken these themes 
and have consolidated them into five main questions that should be considered before embarking 
on a scale up of basic legal services.  For each question set out below we:   
 Outline the issue itself and describe its various dimensions;  
 Provide examples to illustrate why it is important and the impact it can have on basic legal 
service provision as well as scale up; and  
 Propose policy and programme responses to address each question.   
Question 1: Is there Political Support for Basic Legal Service Provision? 
 This is one of the most important factors to consider, especially if the ultimate goal is partial or 
complete government financing of basic legal service provision. Political will may be difficult to 
generate around basic legal service provision because it may not be seen as a quick political win 
like infrastructure which is more visible and education or healthcare provision which may also be 
seen as more tangible. Evidence of political will at the macro level can be best observed through: 
the passage of supportive legislation and through budget allocation either to justice sector 
ministries or through other programmes/entities to provide these services.198  It is very difficult to 
gauge how such political will can be generated, and each context will reflect a unique combination 
of some of the key factors. Political will can come from many areas – national crisis, grass roots 
advocacy campaigns/citizen collective action; constitutional mandates; political party platforms 
and ideology; norms and shared societal values. 
 Examples of the existence of political will at the state level include: 
 Citizens Advice Bureau in England and Wales, which are substantially but not fully funded by 
local and national government and had their origins in the provision of advice and information 
                                                          
and Poverty’; Asia Foundation & ODI (2014-2015), Working Politically In Practice Series; Kleinfield, R. (2015). ‘Improving 
Development Aid Design and Evaluation: Plan for Sailboats, Not Trains’. 
197 Domingo, P., & O’Neil, T. (2014). ‘The politics of legal empowerment: Legal mobilisation strategies and implications for 
development’. ODI. 
198 HiiL. (2012). ‘Towards Basic Justice Care for Everyone. Challenges and Promising Approaches’. Trend Report, Part 1.  
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on wartime regulations by unpaid volunteers during the Second World War, but slowly 
expanded its role from the 1970s onwards. 
 Ontario’s legal aid provision which began over fifty years ago, with legislation, civil society 
organising, initial funding from Ford Foundation, and government task forces created to assess 
impact over time. More recently, a new law was passed in the late 1990s, accompanied by 
government funding to provide legal aid services. 
 South Africa’s Community Advice Offices which date back to the 1930s but were the subject of 
unprecedented growth during the repression and violence that took place during the apartheid 
struggle in the 1980s and have since built a National Alliance and strong relations with the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and Legal Aid South Africa. 
 In Rwanda, rebuilding the justice sector has formed an integral form of the government’s post-
genocide state-building efforts. One-stop district legal centres (Maisons d’Accès à la Justice) 
were piloted by the national government in response to a strategic assessment of poverty 
reduction needs.  
 In the Ukraine, the government has been committed to improving access to justice even during 
major political upheavals. This comes from explicit government endorsement of the value to 
citizens of self-representation and self-generated solutions to legal issues, as evidenced by their 
establishment of Community Legal Centres. 
 Political will at the state level may or may reflect the motivations that donors would like to see.  
China, for example, has established a rule of law programme in which legal aid is central. Whilst 
everything is controlled by the state, there has been central level endorsement of rule of law 
reform, with the motivating rationale being control and order - and to quell any potential risk of 
social unrest. Legal aid is considered critical to promoting social harmony; if the state responds to 
basic grievances, then the population is less likely to revolt. The China case is an interesting example 
of how to generate political will within a state. If the state believes that solving local level disputes 
and grievances in a transparent, consistent manner is a way to prevent conflict and maintain 
stability, then that could be an entry point and an opportunity for generating political will for basic 
legal service provision in states where there is none. 
 Political will should be assessed not only at the macro/state level, but also at the level of front line 
service delivery agencies. If local government and traditional, customary leaders are providing or 
will be expected to provide basic legal services, then those groups will need to be included and 
supportive of the process for scale up to succeed. It is often public bureaucracies that prevent 
change from happening due to inadequate skills, capacity, and inertia. These actors need to be 
incentivised.199  For example: 
                                                          
199 Lin, J. & Arntraud, H. (2008). ‘Scaling up, a framework and lessons for development effectiveness from literature and practice’. 
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 In the Ukraine, CLCs have been successful in communities only with the support of the local 
councils.  Also, given the CLCs’ proximity to and knowledge of the local population, they have 
been able to be responsive to new local problems brought out by conflict and issues posed by 
movements of internally displaced persons in the country. ‘Due to centers’ autonomy, mobility, 
constant capacity-raising activities and multi-functionality, they were able to adjust to new fields 
of work and respond to communities’ needs.’200   
 In Sierra Leone, TIMAP for Justice’s direct engagement with customary leaders to get their buy 
in and support for paralegals overcame the natural hurdle of scepticism of a new model of justice 
service delivery. Before each TIMAP field office was opened, paralegals met with paramount 
chiefs, session chiefs, and village chiefs, and appointed local community oversight boards that 
would oversee the paralegals. These community discussions succeeded in getting buy in from 
traditional leaders, but also identified key justice concerns within communities.   
 If political will does not exist, a number of policy/programme responses are available: 
 Use advocacy and collective action campaigns to ensure that the need for basic legal service 
provision is embedded within society and that there is a political constituency for providing 
these services.201 This is how civil society and human rights organisations in South Africa working 
together with key government counterparts, pushed for gradual movement towards 
government recognition of community based paralegals.202 Legal needs surveys can be a 
valuable tool for raising awareness, as they have been in both Moldova and Ontario.203  
 Engage national governments on basic legal services and government planning, whether in 
support of already approved national strategies, through leveraging an external instrument of 
accountability such as the Global Goals and specially Goal 16, or through other policy/political 
evidence of support to basic legal service provision more generally. 
 Provide basic legal services through NGOs, or other organisations, outside of state structures, 
to build momentum and government buy-in along the way. This is how OSJI worked with TIMAP 
for Justice and other partners in its first couple of years in Sierra Leone, and it was ultimately 
successful in advocating for the passing of the Legal Aid Act, which they see as one of their key 
results. 
 Cross state inspiration can also be used to generate political will to provide basic legal services.   
So, Canada and Australia have looked towards the UK, which began investigating and providing 
legal aid in the 1950s, in keeping with the domestic movement towards a welfare state at that 
time.  The USA went through a similar process in the 1960s, and other states subsequently 
                                                          
200 Open Society Justice Initiative. (2015). ‘Delivering Community Justice Services at Scale: Community Law Centres in Ukraine’ (in 
draft). 
201 Lin, J. & Arntraud, H. (2008). ‘Scaling up, a framework and lessons for development effectiveness from literature and practice’. 
Wolfensohn Center for Development, working paper 5. 
202 Open Society Foundations. (2015). ‘Delivering Community Justice Services at Scale: Community Advice Offices in South Africa’.  
203 Open Society Foundations (2015). ‘Legal Needs Studies: A Brief Overview from the Field’. 
Developing a portfolio of financially sustainable, scalable, basic legal service models 
Final Report, 18 December 2015 
Page 74 of 92 
 
followed them as well.204 More recently, the work of paralegals in Liberia has been influenced 
by the model of TIMAP for Justice in Sierra Leone,205 while the Ukraine has been influenced by 
collaboration and exchange with Ontario, in particular in relation to the value of networks and 
associations of CLCs.206   
 If front line service delivery agencies are blocking / unsure of the changes, they can be brought 
along through a range of ways such as: 
 Understanding of and engagement with interests and concerns to bring agents into the 
process, for example, addressing Government concerns about service quality and oversight or 
addressing lawyers concerns about competition; 
 Creating competitions among jurisdictions and organisations with similar mandates and 
functions, for example, different providers of basic legal services, to help align incentives;207  and 
 Offering incentives, whether monetary or social, for achieving success as well as penalties for 
failure, starting with short term results first, and moving on from there.208 
 If generating political will is less likely, then another option is to go outside the political system or 
outside the justice sector itself to provide basic legal services. For example:   
 Investigating ways to embed legal service provision within other sectors. For example. the 
Open Society Foundations’ Law and Health Initiative has piloted the integration of legal services 
in a variety of health settings including HIV prevention services for drug users in Russia209 and 
palliative care centres in Kenya, where the law is being used in an empowering way through 
provision of trained paralegals who handle legal components of care and work with families on 
common legal issues such as property and wills.210  
 Considering whether to focus on single issues where the messaging may be simpler and it may 
be easier to build a coalition of interests.  Examples are the work that Namati paralegals are 
doing around land in Myanmar211 and Sierra Leone212 as well as in Liberia, Uganda and 
                                                          
204 Interview with Roger Smith, 27 October 2015. 
205 Interview with Lotta Teale, 7 December 2015. 
206 Interview with Zaza Namoradze, 13 October 2015. 
207 Lin, J. & Arntraud, H. (2008). ‘Scaling up, a framework and lessons for development effectiveness from literature and practice’. 
Wolfensohn Center for Development, working paper 5.  
208 Lin, J. & Arntraud, H. (2008). ‘Scaling up, a framework and lessons for development effectiveness from literature and practice’. 
Wolfensohn Center for Development, working paper 5.  
209 Margolin, M. (2014).  Fighting an Epidemic in Russia from 3,000 Miles Away.  Available at 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/fighting-epidemic-russia-3000-miles-away last accessed 12 November 2015  
210 Hepford, K. and Ali, Z. (2014).  When Relieving Suffering Means Removing Legal Burdens.  Available at 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/when-relieving-suffering-means-removing-legal-burdens last accessed 12 
November 
211 See Annex F: Community-based Paralegals Case Study; Namati Sector-Specific Paralegals in Myanmar. 
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Mozambique.213  This may involve trading off breadth of service provision against depth; but 
against this, it may enable particularly marginalised groups to be better targeted. 
 Exploring private adjudication mechanisms to stand in for state-provided service provision if 
states are not willing to provide services which are affordable and timely.214 
Question 2: Is there a Normative Fit/Sufficient Demand for Basic Legal Services?    
 When considering introducing basic legal service provision into a particular context, or when trying 
to scale up provision, it is important to assess whether the right normative environment exists to 
support that service provision, and whether there is sufficient demand for the services to make the 
overall effort worthwhile.  After all, law is a normative system that exists in the minds of people in 
a particular society.215  It goes beyond the institutions with direct connections with the law 
themselves, and involves intangibles related to how citizens ‘understand, use, and value’ the law.216  
This understanding, use, and value of the law held among citizens in a particular context will impact 
whether or not basic legal service provision or scale up will succeed and should impact how 
programmes / policies will need to be tailored to maximise potential for positive impact.  
 In addition, basic cultural and social issues such as power inequalities, community cohesion and 
conflict, gender roles all shape basic legal service provision as the demand for services comes 
directly out of those social realities.  Often, societal fault lines can be easily observed in the types 
of cases and disputes that arise.217  In Ukraine for example, Community Law Centres in Roma 
settlements have focused on Roma specific issues such as anti-discrimination, restoration of ID 
documents, humanitarian assistance, land and property, etc.218 
 Lessons from other sectors on insufficient demand are useful to examine here.  For example, there 
have been difficulties in gauging demand in particular contexts for preventative health and family 
planning services, as well as for education programmes. Insufficient demand can come from a range 
of factors such as distrust of the state, a lack of understanding of basic rights, cultural or religious 
beliefs, norms around adversarial dispute resolution approaches verses more restorative, 
reconciliatory approaches, etc.   
 Examples of how the normative environment, social and cultural issues, and insufficient demand 
have impacted the provision of legal and justice services include the following:  
                                                          
213 Maru, V. (undated).  ‘Legal Empowerment and the Land Rush: Three Struggles’. 
214 HiiL. (2012). ‘Towards Basic Justice Care for Everyone. Challenges and Promising Approaches’. Trend Report, Part 1. 
215 Carothers, T. (2003). ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: the Problem of Knowledge’. Working Paper 34. Carnegie Endowment 
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217 Maru, V. & Gauri, V. (draft). ‘Bringing Law to Life: Community Paralegals and the Pursuit of Justice’.  
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 In Liberia, there is an almost unanimous distrust of courts, formal procedures are little known 
and there is a widely held view that formal structures are dominated by vested interests.  This 
context has created a demand for non-state basic legal service provision through paralegals and 
Community Justice Advisers. Such programming demonstrates that Liberians are receptive to 
non-binding mediation and engaging dialogue without the threat of formal legal sanction.  
 Many paralegal movements around the world developed as social movements—for example, in 
South Africa and the Philippines.219 These movements were more focused on activism:  people 
power in the Philippines, and the anti- apartheid movement in South Africa, to address 
immediate crises born out of power imbalances between citizens and a range of actors such as 
private firms, the state, and regressive cultural norms. The ability of paralegals to succeed came 
from the unique institutional and social context in which they originated.   
 Existence of a pro bono culture is a normative, social value that can have significant impact on 
the ability to scale up basic legal service provision. For example, Kituo Cha Sheria in Kenya— 
user demand at their legal aid centre has gone from 3000 to 7000 customers in one year, but 
they cannot respond to the demand due to a lack of incentives for lawyers to work pro bono on 
cases that are referred to them.220  Similar problems suggest themselves from Microjusticia 
Argentina’s decision to remunerate its volunteers in the near future.221  This contrasts with the 
strong tradition of a pro bono culture in China’s legal aid clinics.222 Similarly important is the size 
of the pool of legal professionals in a given context; although the lack of incentives for pro bono 
work may pose challenges for Microjusticia Argentina, the initiative is able to draw on a large 
pool of expertise owing to free and unrestricted access to education. 
 Evidence of current community based legal service schemes, however formal or informal, is 
another way to gauge the normative environment for expanded basic legal service provision.  If 
this exists in a society or community already, this is a foundation that can be built upon.223  
 One of the reasons for the success of the M-Pesa scale up in Kenya was the existence of a hawala 
culture, an East African money transfer network operated by members of the Somali 
community, itself made possible by the absence of government impositions such as taxes and 
fixed exchange rates, and the sole requirement of trust in the sender rather than formal banking 
credentials.224 
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 If there is insufficient normative fit, there are a number of potential policy/programme responses 
including: 
 Integrating sensitivity to culture, and the social and normative environment into 
policy/programme design and staying flexible enough to respond to changes in it, for example, 
by not neglecting traditional justice systems and by genuinely listening to what people need and 
how they need it. Absent such sensitivity, scale up could fail. The best-known example of failure 
in programme scale up has been seen in the cultural obstacles to expanded girls’ education.225 
Many of these obstacles have come from cultural constraints including deep seated gender 
stereotypes, social norms, and customs linked to perceptions of women’s roles in society such 
as their roles as caretakers, mothers, brides, and household labourers. These perceptions, as 
well as scarce household resources, all influence the social and economic value placed on 
sending girls to school.  
 A realistic assessment of demand is key as well as the factors to increase that demand (if 
needed) during scale up.226  Programmes tailored to this demand will more likely succeed, and 
programmes that start with those specific services where demand is already high, and then 
move slowly forward from there into less demanded areas of service provision, will also have a 
better change to achieve impact and scale. Here, it is important to recognise the trade-offs 
revealed by work in the sectors of health and education where it has been suggested that work 
towards reducing the mortality of children aged under 5 benefitted the poor relative to the 
poorest due to challenges raising demand amongst and then reaching the latter group227 while 
that directed at achieving universal primary education sought, in contrast, to target the most 
disadvantaged through policies such as abolishing fees in countries like Tanzania.228 Both 
potentially present challenges regarding the equal treatment of beneficiary groups. 
 A lack of sufficient demand and a lack of a supportive normative environment can also be 
addressed by proactively engaging to either generate demand or attempt to alter societal 
norms, through a range of techniques including collective action, advocacy, legal empowerment 
campaigns, etc. 
Question 3: Is there Resistance from Elite or Vested interests?   
 Proposing basic legal service delivery improvements or scale up can threaten a range of elite and 
vested interests. These include agencies within government that view programmes as competition; 
professionals such as lawyers who view these efforts as a threat to their livelihoods; and elites 
worried that through legitimate legal service delivery to the poor, they could lose control over 
                                                          
225 Lin, J. & Arntraud, H. (2008). ‘Scaling up, a framework and lessons for development effectiveness from literature and practice’. 
Wolfensohn Center for Development, working paper 5.  
226 Lin, J. & Arntraud, H. (2008). ‘Scaling up, a framework and lessons for development effectiveness from literature and practice’. 
Wolfensohn Center for Development, working paper 5.  
227 UN Committee for Development Policy (2008).  Implementing the Millennium Development Goals: Health Inequality and the 
Role of Global Health Partnerships. 
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valuable assets such as land and natural resources. Public bureaucracies can also stall reform efforts 
due to lack of capacity, resources, or simply inertia. 
 Resistance from elites and vested interests is especially common among grassroots movements 
that grow too quickly so as to threaten established political interests.  The result is a loss in political 
support for the movement/reform agenda. When there is a loss in political support, it makes it even 
harder for donors to continue to support the agenda – this becomes a political capital issue for 
donors with host country governments. The issue is not unique to legal service provision: education 
reform in many countries has been met with resistance from teachers and teachers’ unions, both 
in developing and developed countries; time required to address their concerns has set reform 
movements back considerably. 
 Specific examples of resistance from elite, vested interests include:  
 Traditional leaders in Sierra Leone who historically provided most of the dispute resolution 
services at the local level, and who saw paralegals as an economic threat;  
 Lawyers229 opposed to legal aid reform in the UK and Liberia, where they have thus far resisted 
any formal role of non-lawyers in the provision of basic legal services; and 
 Central government in Bangladesh who have viewed organisations like BRAC with suspicion, 
treating them as competitors. 
 Resistance from elite and vested interests, like many political economy issues, is not necessarily 
clear-cut.  The evidence from local governments on this is mixed.  For example, in South Africa 
where paralegals engage with police and local representatives of national government 
departments, some local officials welcome their efforts, even when it led to reversal of decisions or 
payments of benefits that had been denied.230  However, other local South African officials, 
particularly from local municipalities who are to be providing similar services, are not supportive 
and see paralegals as competition.231   
 It is important to note that lawyers who are resistant to changes in basic legal service provision may 
be suspicious not simply out of a concern for their livelihoods, but out of fear of an over-reaching 
state; this has been a common experience in many countries in central and eastern Europe.232  
 There are various policy/programme responses to the problem of political opposition including: 
                                                          
229 Maru, V. & Gauri, V. (draft). ‘Bringing Law to Life: Community Paralegals and the Pursuit of Justice’. 
230 Maru, V. & Gauri, V. (draft). ‘Bringing Law to Life: Community Paralegals and the Pursuit of Justice’. 
231 NADCAO. (2014). ‘Towards a Sustainable and Effective CAO Sector in South Africa: A Cost Benefit and Qualitative Analysis’. 
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 Promote ‘second best’ solutions (ones that are more politically feasible) first, to get buy-in, and 
then subsequently to move forward with original plans.233  In the Philippines, paralegals were in 
direction competition with the bar.  The solution was to have paralegals specialise in sectoral 
issues, where they were recognised by four central government agencies to work on disputes 
related to those specific departments: for example, agrarian reform (department of agrarian 
reform’s adjudication board), labour tribunals (national labour relations commission), 
community based coast guards (local governments), forest guards (department of environment 
& natural resources).234  This specialisation reflected recognition from administrative agencies 
of citizens’ needs to hold state institutions accountable, without directly antagonising the Bar.   
 Build coalitions.  In Sierra Leone, OSJI and Namati, working with TIMAP for Justice and other 
partners, undertook a sustained campaign of awareness raising which involved targeted 
meetings with important justice sector actors to gain support for legal aid reform.  One main 
sceptic was the Bar Association, which thought that paralegals would tarnish the reputation of 
the legal profession. These actions were ultimately successful, as both the bar and the original 
sceptics within government supported the inclusion of paralegal services into law.235  
 Embed basic legal service delivery into other types of programmes. Examples of this come 
mainly from the health sector:  a health and Roma programme in Macedonia236 and a cadre of 
frontline advocates in Mozambique,237 both of which are institutionalising legal services in 
healthcare provision, whilst GFATM has funded paralegals within broader support services to 
sex workers in South Africa.238 
 Focus on building a long-term partnership, particularly between external actors, civil society 
and governments. The move from NGO led service provision to public sector led service 
provision is a cultural shift that can be very difficult; it requires not only an understanding of the 
incentives of the various groups involved, but also time and energy.239  In South Africa, a long 
term process involving civil society and government working together, resulted in changes in 
legislation for legal recognition.240 
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Question 4: Is there Capacity for Scale Up? 
 Capacity for scaling up is critical for success:  this includes government capacity, capacity within the 
organisation that is attempting to go to scale, as well as leadership capacity to inspire, lead, and 
manage the process. 
 The capacity of core justice ministries should be assessed internally but so should their ability to 
work across government. One common area of challenge for justice sector ministries is their ability 
to advocate for financing from their own ministries of finance, and then to track and present results 
back on what the financing was able to achieve. At LDP, we have supported a range of justice sector 
ministries, departments, and agencies in many countries to address this issue through strengthen 
their planning and budgeting systems. For example, our work in Sierra Leone in this area 
contributed to a 57% increase from 2013 to 2014 in non-salary non-interest recurrent (NSNIR) 
budget allocation to sector ministries, departments, and agencies that received support with 
planning and budgeting, compared with a 38% budget increase overall across the whole of 
government.241 
 Understanding budgeting and resource allocation processes of government counterparts is also 
essential so that if there is a legitimate procedural delay in government resource allocation that 
delay does not get misconstrued as a lack of political will to move forward. For example, in Sierra 
Leone, after the passage of the Legal Aid bill, there was significant delay in resources being allocated 
to implement the bill.  In recent discussions in Freetown, it became clear that the delay has been 
mainly due to the fact that there is no system for costing budgeting of legislation. So the process of 
linking new legislation to resources took time within government. The first allocation has since 
come through at USD 40,000, along with government commitment to pay salaries for 8 staff on the 
new legal aid board.242  
 Organisations that plan to scale up need systems, support, leadership, capacity, training, quality 
assurance and sufficient time as well as funding.243  One reason why BRAC has been successful in 
Bangladesh has been in its community-based education as well as other work streams is due to its 
strong internal systems.244 Lessons from Ontario’s scaling up of basic legal services include:  
developing strong quality assurance systems and standards, articulating clear accountability 
structures among the various institutions involved, and choosing staff who were committed to 
social justice and access to justice.245   Similar quality assurance steps are being taken in China.246  
The extensive training delivered to new paralegals as part of TIMAP for Justice’s scaling up work in 
                                                          
241 DFID. (2014). ‘Sierra Leone Access to Security and Justice Programme, Value for Money programme report’. 
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Sierra Leone also demonstrates the value of investing in capacity.247 A ‘learning by doing’ culture 
that values adaptation and iteration and is open to change is also vital to the success of scaling up. 
 At times, for a scale up to be successful, the organisation may need to split into two entities: the 
originating organisation that develops and pilots the model; and the adopting organisation that 
takes the model to scale.248 It may also be the case that taking the model to scale involves not simply 
expanding the scale of a pilot, but thinking holistically about the justice system and how scaling up 
a pilot may influence and/or call for development of other aspects of the system. So, in the context 
of legal services, scaling up a model of basic legal provision may require thinking about the level 
and quality of secondary and tertiary provision and how a model of national provision might 
evolve into a model of hybrid provision.  At this point, it may also be important to separate the 
entity that funds and regulates the service provision from the entity that delivers it in order to 
preserve the independence of the latter. Legal Aid South Africa demonstrates the value of such an 
approach, being located outside government and therefore being able to litigate against it.249 
 Scale ups need strong leaders and champions – outstanding personalities who can generate 
commitment through shared values; who can identify key challenges; who have technical and 
management skills; and who have the capacity and motivation to train others.250  The Doing 
Development Differently agenda within the international development practice makes this point 
very clearly: it is aid entrepreneurs’ –people who can operate within complexity, who are politically 
attuned, and who have the right soft skills—those types of individuals will have the most chance of 
delivering success,251 particularly in fragile contexts.252  Leaders within the political sphere are also 
needed for scale up to be successful.  At times, they will need to be reminded that it is in their 
interest to support the scale up of service delivery and improved service provision.253  The Attorney 
General and Minister of Justice in Sierra Leone are an example of this, having agreed to support a 
shared framework on basic legal service provision in Sierra Leone; 254 so too is the Deputy Minister 
of Justice in South Africa.255 
 Where capacity is lacking, there are a variety of policy/programme responses including: 
 Traditional development and donor mechanisms such as trainings, joint strategy planning, 
working groups, awareness raising, etc. But in terms of scaling up service delivery, lack of 
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capacity should be reflected into programme timings and budget allocations – to ensure that 
these issues are addressed proactively throughout the process. 
 Building a network of service providers across an area or country to maximise reach and impact 
for end users if no single provider has sufficient capacity to scale. This has proven successful in 
the efforts to scaling up basic legal service provision in South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Ontario.256 
 Recruiting the right people having clearly articulated the types of skills that are needed, 
especially the non-technical ‘soft’ skills that will be essential to success as well as developing 
strategies for retaining staff, such as investing in training and accreditation mechanisms, which 
can also assist with maintaining links with staff and quality individuals. 
Is there sufficient financing for scale up?   
 Financing for scale up of basic legal services can come from a number of sources:  donors, 
governments, philanthropic sources, the private sectors and combinations of these, as explored 
under Research Question 2. This involves considering whether governments have sufficient 
resources and political will to either set aside central level funding for basic legal services, as in 
Rwanda, or to investigate other ways to fund it, such as in Ontario and Ukraine. If the government 
does not have sufficient resources, donor and philanthropic funding, at least to achieve shorter-
term results, and to create momentum for broader service provision, is an alternative and private 
sector options can be explored alongside.  Important to philanthropy are changes in priorities and 
the sustainability of such funding streams, as we have seen.  Important to private provision is the 
political economy of the regulatory landscape and whether or not approval is needed for such 
options. 
 Where financing options are limited, there are a range of policy/programme responses including: 
 Exploring private sector provision rather than merely financing. Supplying third party 
adjudication is a task that some governments have already outsourced to independent courts, 
but they could explore how those mechanisms could be expanded to other areas in order to 
achieve effectiveness, fairness, and justice. The neutrality of these mechanisms can be achieved 
through appropriate supervision, legal information sharing, standard protocols and justice 
surveys.257 
 Exploring combinations of mechanisms or models simultaneously, while some of the specific 
financial, political, and social dimensions of sustainability are explored.  Over time, these efforts 
could be converted to more and more self-sustaining models – either through government 
budgeting or alternative mechanisms. 
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 Considering whether technology can play to support programme/policy objectives of scaling up 
of basic legal services. A note of caution, however: as we have seen in the discussion in Chapter 
3, technology is not a complete answer. Technology can be supportive of overall strategic efforts 
and can supplement some aspects of service provision for some users but it is not the panacea 
for lack of financing. In fact, introducing technology may even lead to less access, if the 
technology is not matched to the specific legal needs of those users and to the level of pre-
existing access of and use of that technology. 
 Considering the purpose of scale up in a particular context: is it simply to provide access to 
more/all possible users or is it linked to advocacy for broader political, social, or normative 
change? If broader political, social, or normative change is the ultimate goal, then financial 
sustainability might not necessarily be required to achieve that outcome, especially if there is a 
specific timeframe already in place for achieving the desired result. An example of this is 
Namati’s paralegals in Myanmar who seek to provide services that empower farmers to protect 
their land and also to undertake evidence-based advocacy efforts to try to shift the government 
policies in favour of smallholder farmers at a particularly important juncture in time.258 
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Chapter 6:      Conclusions and Recommendations 
There are a number of promising basic legal service interventions in countries around the world which have 
begun the process of thinking about sustainable scale-up.  Those countries could give valuable thought to 
data collection can help them build a case for financing.  The unit cost analysis presented in this study 
suggests that costs are relatively modest, but still unaffordable for governments in the poorest countries.  
Alternative options for sustainable financing should therefore be explored together with policy and 
programme responses to any political economy factors which may hinder successful scale up.  Global Goal 
16 offers a valuable opportunity to coalesce data gathering activities as well as advocacy for basic legal 
service provision on a national scale that may be transformative of both the political economy of the issue 
and the available financing options. 
Conclusions 
 This study has provided a framework for thinking about how to take basic legal services to scale in 
a sustainable manner.  Research in this area is very under-developed relative to other sectors and 
this study has only been able to begun to provide answers to the identified questions.  However, 
these initial conclusions are of real value in guiding thinking on this issue, but most importantly, 
they provide a clear guide to the areas in which further work would be valuable. 
The Cost of Basic Legal Services 
 The unit costs of basic legal service provision in 12 of our country case studies are USD 0.1 to USD 
1.3 per capita in non-OECD countries and USD 3 to USD 6 in 3 OECD countries, likely reflecting the 
higher cost of wages.  Using legal needs surveys to assess the scale up costs of national provision 
and the per capita cost of that provision in 4 countries (Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and South 
Africa) produces a cost per person of USD 0.1 to USD 0.36.  
 However, benchmarking scale up costs against macro-level data such as government revenue per 
capita and government spending on the judiciary per capita demonstrates that while some 
countries could afford to scale up current programmes, for most of the poorest countries in our 
study the cost of basic legal services looks clearly unaffordable relative to both government 
revenues and spending on the judiciary. 
 Analysis of spending on judiciary also demonstrates that developing countries are already strongly 
prioritising funding the judiciary from their own budgets.  In sharp contrast, analysis of donor 
funding shows that while funding to the justice sector has increased, the current level is still very 
low compared to funding for other sectors. This suggests there is a potential opportunity to press 
donors to increase their funding to bring it more in line with developing countries’ own 
commitments and the spending patterns in donors’ own countries.  
 Technology is no silver bullet for reducing the cost of basic legal service provision in developing 
countries.  Technology is likely to be supplementary to rather than displacing of traditional forms 
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of delivery, with mobile-phone based innovations offering better access to individuals than 
internet-based ones at the present time. 
Financing Basic Legal Services 
 There are a range options for financing basic legal services sustainably, including government, 
donors, philanthropy, the private sector, users and hybrid models.  The key factors determining the 
appropriateness of a particular option are whether the relevant basic legal service intervention 
produces a monetisable outcome and/or an outcome which can be measured.  Unbundling basic 
legal services may therefore be key to realising these characteristics and expanding the available 
financing options for a given intervention. 
The Political Economy of Basic Legal Services 
 Political economy considerations in scaling include: 
 Whether there is political support for scale-up, both at the state level and the level of front-line 
delivery agencies, recognising that political will may not always reflect the motivations that we 
might like to see; 
 Whether there is normative fit/sufficient demand for the services, whether that be a tradition 
of mediation or a pro bono culture amongst lawyers; 
 Whether there is resistance from elite/vested interests, whether traditional leaders, lawyers or 
local and central government; 
 Whether there is capacity for scale-up both within government and within the organisations 
that plan to scale up; and 
 Whether there is financing for sufficient financing for scale-up, depending on whether it is for 
short-to medium term advocacy or for the provision of services over the long-term. 
 There are a number of policy and programming responses to situational analysis that reveals that 
some or all of these factors are missing.  These range from building demand/support for basic legal 
service provision to delivering basic legal services either through service delivery in other sectors 
such as health or outside of state structures altogether. 
Recommendations  
 We would make the following recommendations by way of future work: 
 Presentation of final report to meeting of selected stakeholders at a date to be confirmed. 
 Wider collection and deeper analysis of legal needs surveys to better understand the scale and 
type of demand for basic legal services (including demand on criminal justice system and 
traditional justice systems), what demand is being met by existing legal service provision and 
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what is not and why (for example because existing provision is unaffordable for the majority of 
people). 
 Wider collection of a broader range of cost and benefit data (in particular, non-monetary costs 
and monetary and non-monetary benefits) for use in cost-benefit analyses of basic legal service 
provision. 
 More widespread use of macro-level data to benchmark costs including possible development 
of three affordability benchmarks259 relative to revenue, spending on judiciary and spending on 
health and education, to ensure country programmes are based on sustainable level of unit costs 
and to support bids for donor  funding at an individual country level. 
 Development of an agreed definition of basic and primary justice concepts to enable the justice 
sector to be on the same footing as education and health in global financing discussions, debates 
on implementation of Global Goals and value for money analysis such as the Copenhagen 
Consensus.260 
 Evaluation of the use of technology looking in particular at whether those on low incomes are 
able to use the services provided and whether the quality of assistance is as good as that 
provided by traditional means as well as flagging those cases that require such assistance. 
 We hope full opportunity will be taken of the momentum and discussions around Global Goal 16 to 
coalesce data gathering activities as well as advocacy for basic legal service provision on a national 
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Appendix 1: Summary of Aid to Justice Sector (2005-2013) 
 
Aid to legal and judicial development 
Constant US$ million 2013 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total % total 
Total aid all sectors 145,583      151,892      139,742      161,339      167,998      167,460      160,700   170,610    187,142   1,452,466 
Total aid to legal and judicial development (definition below) 1,085          1,028          1,896          2,769          3,589          4,183          4,277       3,713        3,799       26,339     
0.7% 0.7% 1.4% 1.7% 2.1% 2.5% 2.7% 2.2% 2.0% 1.8%
Bilateral donors - total 796             693             1,617          2,233          3,260          3,715          3,810       2,699        3,145       21,968     83%
United States 329             201             1,002          1,682          2,511          3,002          2,877       1,973        2,084       15,661     59%
Australia 105             151             249             103             119             199             271          238           218          1,654       6%
Germany 25               27               55               53               70               144             137          137           172          818          3%
Japan 1                 0                 1                 7                 23               14               220          35             278          579          2%
Netherlands 27               62               40               47               40               41               17            47             66            387          1%
United Kingdom 30               21               29               45               81               22               25            28             41            322          1%
Multilateral donors - total 289             336             278             536             329             468             467          1,013        653          4,369       17%
EU Institutions 230             235             188             509             240             374             342          757           558          3,433       13%
UNDP 10                   12                   13                   10                   27                   26                   20                28                 31                177          1%
Recipients
Afghanistan 58             22             188           425           717           1,034        796          719           799          4,758       18%
Iraq 190           62             172           85             722           173           732          275           197          2,609       10%
Mexico 0               0               44             15             401           591           280          39             348          1,719       7%
West Bank and Gaza Strip 16             4               4               103           139           191           154          200           371          1,182       4%
Colombia 29             23             19             60             39             243           64            214           150          840          3%
Pakistan 2                     1                     32                   32                   79                   231                116             126              41                660          3%
Solomon Islands 38             1               189           26             34             35             135          112           89            658          2%
Kosovo .. .. .. .. 86             55             38            172           181          532          2%
Serbia 66                   46                   57                   110                15                   26                   44                41                 35                438          2%
Haiti 8               41             8               36             22             30             114          95             17            371          1%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 42                   44                   21                   18                   21                   51                   72                49                 37                354          1%
Indonesia 34                   7                     46                   36                   18                   80                   30                30                 47                327          1%
Turkey 47                   15                   34                   80                   11                   34                   8                  63                 31                323          1%
Papua New Guinea 32                   78                   16                   6                     56                   13                   37                33                 47                319          1%
Ukraine 12                   10                   15                   10                   21                   122                16                60                 20                285          1%
Guatemala 7                   
  
4                   
  
14                 
  
29                 
  
42                 
  
79                 
  
31                30                 28                264          1%
Democratic Republic of the Congo 24             25             13             14             59             21             38            45             18            258          1%
Kenya 46             25             0               1               4               13             8              112           4              212          1%
Developing Countries unspecified 8               15             486           818           207           297           538          250           306          2,924       11%
Sub Saharan Africa 238                274                182                337                455                268                348             367              425              2,894       11%
Aid to legal and judical development as % of total aid 
2010 2011 2012 2013Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
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Implied % of 
population with 
legal need each 
year 
Low income/Lower middle income  countries -  legal needs surveys   
Sierra Leone 81% encountered legal issue in 
last 3 years; 50% excluding 
crime - implies 17% 
encountered civil issue a year  
Assume 5 people in 
household261 
3% 
Rwanda 30% asked for legal advice in last 
3 years - implies 10% a year 
Assume 5 people in 
household 
2% 
Ukraine: level of legal 
capacity of Ukrainian 
population 2011  
30% encountered “very 
important” legal problem in last 
3 years – implies 10% each year 
Assume 3 people in 
household  
3% 
High income/OECD - legal needs surveys  
Argentina 55% preceding three years; one 
third crime, implies 36% 
excluding crime - implies 13% a 
year 
Assume 5 in 
household 
2% 
Australia 50% in last year, excluding crime 
36% - implies  36% a year 
Average 3.0 people 
in household  
12% 
Canada 48% low/moderate income in 
last three years - 16% a year 
Average 2.7 people 
in household 
6% 
England and Wales 32% in last 18 months Average 2.5 people 
in household 
8.5% 
Netherlands 61% in last five years - 12% a 
year  
Average 2.5 people 
in household 
5% 
US Legal Service 
Corporation - current 
cases plus estimated 
unserved need 
1,833,376 cases 51 million 
(population living in 
poverty) 
4% 
                                                          
261 Household size from unstat.un.org. Where figures not available assumption is based on average for comparable countries in 
region/income group. Figures are often out of date so are likely to overstate household size and hence understate % of population 
with legal need.  
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US Legal Service 
Corporation – survey 
estimates  that only 20% 




51 million 9% 
Memorandum items -  Coverage of existing schemes 
Sierra Leone – Timap – 
2005/2006 data  
1,920 cases  736,000 0.3% 
Liberia – Carter Center – 
current coverage  
1,272 cases  575,329 0.2% 
UK – Citizens advice 
Bureau England & Wales 
– current coverage 
2,500,000 cases 57 million 4% 
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Appendix 3: Summary of Unit and Scale Up Cost Analysis 


















Liberia 0.45 1,272 575,329 0.78 4.4 3.4  
Myanmar 3.8  
Assume whole farmer 
population 13m 
0.3 53.0 15.5 
Namati estimate for reaching all farmers, not 
entire population (53m). 
Sierra Leone 0.25  736,000 0.34 6.3 2.1 
Timap current programme less USD 10k 
Freetown; Namati estimate for national 
programme 
 2.0  
Assume whole 
population 6.3m 
0.36 6.3 2.0  
Argentina 0.028 441 22,050 (estimate) 1.3 43.0 54.7 Multiplier of 50 assumed (cases-community). 
Bangladesh 0.3 5,000 250,000 (estimate) 1.1 159.1 181.8 Multiplier of 50 assumed (cases-community). 
Rwanda 0.8 22,168 1,108,400 (estimate) 0.7 11.3 8.1 
Multiplier of 50 assumed (cases-community). 
National scale up total legal aid, not MAJ prog 
South Africa 3.5  
Assume whole 
population 54m 
0.1 54.0 3.5 Estimated cost of Citizen Advice Offices  
Ukraine 0.44 42,284 2,114,200 (estimate) 0.2 45.4 9.4 Multiplier of 50 assumed (cases-community). 
Kenya 0.1 20,000 1,000,000 (estimate) 0.1 44.9 5.1 Multiplier of 50 assumed (cases-community). 
Australia 23.8 29,266 
Assume whole state 
population  4.7m 
5.1 23.5 119.3 Legal aid in Queensland 
Canada 44.0  
Assume state whole 
population 12.8m 
3.4 35.5 122.2 Citizen advice bureau in Ontario 
UK  361 2.5 million 
Assume whole 
population 57.4m 
6.3 64.5 405.7 Citizen Advice Bureau in England and Wales 
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Appendix 4: Summary of Benchmarking Analysis 
Programme 



































































% GDP % GDP % GDP Per capita Per capita Per capita % % % 
Liberia 0.78  370 108 1.2 3.6 2.8 4 13 10 18 0.72 18 
Myanmar  0.3 1,270 126 Na 0.5 0.8  6 10    
Sierra Leone 0.34 0.36 710 78 0.1 1.7 2.8 0.6 12 20 2 0.40 51 
              
Argentina 1.3  14,160 2,124 0.4 4.9 5.1 55 697 722 4 0.06 2 
Bangladesh 1.1  1,080 113 0.05 1.3 2.1 1 14 23 1 1.01 208 
              
Rwanda 0.7 0.3 700 93 1.9 7 5 2 46 35 16 0.31 15 
              
South Africa  0.1 6,800 2,114 0.8 4.3 6.0 54 294 408 8 0.003 0.1 
Ukraine 0.2  3,560 1,317 0.3 4.2 6.7 10 151 239 3 0.02 2 
              
Kenya 0.1  1,290 205 0.2 2 6.7 2 24 86 2 0.06 5 
Uganda   680 67  4 2  29 15    
              
Australia 5.1  64,680 15,523 0.06 6.3 4.9 41 4,065 3,169 1 0.03 12 
Canada 3.4  51,690 8,787 0.22 7.6 5.3 114 3,918 2,740 2 0.04 3 
Netherlands   51,210 19,921 0.15 10.7 5.5 78 5,483 2,817 1   
UK 6.3  42,690 15,368 0.07 7.6 5.8 31 3,252 2,476 0.5 0.04 20 
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